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Special Incentives to Sue 
Margaret H. Lemos† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The practical meaning of federal law depends in large part 
on the choices legislators make about enforcement. Congress 
can opt for public or private enforcement,1 and can modulate 
the level of enforcement through mechanisms that encourage or 
discourage suit, or that make it more or less likely that plain-
tiffs will prevail.2 This Article focuses on devices designed to in-
crease the rate of private litigation: attorneys’ fee shifts for 
prevailing plaintiffs, and damage enhancements such as mul-
tipliers or punitive damages. The avowed purpose of such pro-
visions is to strengthen private enforcement of the affected 
statutes. Boosting enforcement is, of course, a contestable goal, 
implicating longstanding debates about excessive litigation and 
deterrence of valuable activity.3 But debates about the optimal 
 
†  Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thanks to 
Scott Hemphill, Max Minzner, Rafael Pardo, Uriel Procaccia, Alex Reinert, 
Neil Siegel, Kevin Stack, Alex Stein, Stewart Sterk, Julie Suk, Mark Weiner, 
and participants at a faculty workshop at the Cardozo School of Law for help-
ful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to Alexa Fang for outstand-
ing research assistance. Copyright © 2011 by Margaret H. Lemos. 
 1. For a small sampling of the vast literature on the choice between pub-
lic and private enforcement, see generally Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil 
Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case 
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005); 
Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1283–315 (1982).  
 2. This Article explores the effects of litigation incentives, which tend to 
boost the level of private enforcement. For a discussion of mechanisms that 
decrease enforcement, thereby ameliorating problems of over-deterrence, see 
generally Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1743 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 35 (1976) (noting that private antitrust actions, which Congress has 
encouraged through treble damages, have “induced enormous, and I think jus-
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level of enforcement have taken place without a full under-
standing of how suit-boosters actually work. Although a few 
scholars have studied the effects of particular incentives in con-
text,4 there has been no effort to assess the efficacy of fee shifts 
or damage enhancements as a general enforcement strategy, or 
to consider their impact on judges and the law.  
I argue that statutory mechanisms designed to advance the 
goals of federal law through private litigation can backfire, 
prompting judges to adopt procedural rules that counteract the 
effect of fee shifts and damage enhancements, and to interpret 
the substantive provisions of the relevant statutes narrowly. To 
begin with, it is not clear that litigation incentives, particularly 
fee shifts, work in the sense of strengthening enforcement. 
Economic theory predicts that plaintiff-side fee shifts and dam-
age enhancements will increase the number of claims filed un-
der the relevant statutes, either by reducing the cost of litiga-
tion or by increasing the benefits. The available empirical 
evidence tells a different story. The evidence supports the theo-
retical prediction that enhanced damages will generate more 
suits, but it suggests that one-way attorneys’ fee shifts do not 
consistently lead to higher filing rates. The upshot is that liti-
gation incentives seem to be encouraging litigation where we 
 
tified, concern about the overexpansion of the antitrust laws and their increas-
ing use to retard rather than promote competition”); Donald I. Baker, Revisit-
ing History—What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement that 
We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 379, 384 (2004) 
(“Over-deterrence and unpredictability are recurring problems in various anti-
trust areas subject to the rule of reason, and the risks of litigating close ques-
tions are simply magnified by the presence of mandatory treble damages to 
punish any ‘wrong’ action.”); Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citi-
zen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 66 (1989) (arguing that environ-
mental citizen suits, which Congress has encouraged through one-way fee 
shifts, may lead to over-enforcement of environmental laws); see also infra 
notes 187–90 and accompanying text (discussing complaints that litigation in-
centives lead to excessive and sometimes frivolous litigation). 
 4. See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: 
Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–
31 (2009) [hereinafter Farhang, Congressional Mobilization] (examining the 
effects of a damage enhancement on Title VII claiming behavior); Stewart J. 
Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The 
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 719, 746 (1987). The most comprehensive treatment of litiga-
tion incentives to date is SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC 
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) [hereinafter 
FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE]. Farhang focuses in large part on the political 
forces that lead to the enactment of litigation incentives, and he provides a de-
tailed discussion of the causes, and some of the effects, of the 1991 amend-
ments to Title VII that added enhanced damages. 
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need it least—in areas where the threat of multiple or punitive 
damages operates to deter violations. 
When special incentives do boost litigation rates, moreover, 
they may trigger a judicial backlash against the very rights 
that Congress sought to promote. It bears emphasis that the 
term “private enforcement” is a misnomer. Private litigants do 
not have the power to enforce the law directly, in the sense of 
ordering coercive remedies against statutory violators. At most, 
private litigants can activate an enforcement regime that ulti-
mately is controlled by courts. Given that most federal statutes 
contain gaps and ambiguities, judicial enforcement is not me-
chanical but entails an important element of discretion.5 
Through the process of statutory enforcement and interpreta-
tion, judges determine the ultimate content of the law. Unlike 
legislators, however, judges cannot pick their opportunities for 
lawmaking. Judges can only decide the cases that are brought 
before them, and not all cases are created equal. It is well 
known that advocacy groups seeking to push the law in a par-
ticular direction do not litigate any old case, but try to find the 
best possible vehicle—a case with a sympathetic plaintiff and 
bad facts for the defendant.6 Similarly, repeat-player litigants 
take special care to settle any cases that might generate unfa-
vorable precedent that will affect operations going forward.7 
Both practices reflect a recognition that the law is shaped by 
 
 5. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered 
Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428–34 
(2008) (discussing the policymaking discretion that courts inevitably exercise 
when interpreting statutes). 
 6. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & C.K. Rowland, Interest Groups in the Courts: 
Do Groups Fare Better?, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 275, 281 (Allan J. Cigler 
& Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986) (“Rather than bringing just any case to 
the court, interest groups try to pick ‘winners,’ cases that they cannot only 
win, but also those that will help them to build favorable precedent.”); Lean-
dra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit 
Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 241 
(1999) (“The strategy of picking cases with favorable facts and sympathetic 
plaintiffs explains how interest groups can rely on the path-dependence of 
precedent to influence the development of the law despite standing doctrine. 
In effect, interest groups can weight both the pool of docketed cases by picking 
cases with favorable facts and the pool of which cases go to trial by being un-
willing to settle these favorable cases.”); Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutional-
ism’s Hard When You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to Courts, 
42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 380 (2008) (discussing the American Civil Liberties 
Union’s “careful selection of test cases”). 
 7. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 100–03 (1974); infra notes 
141–43 and accompanying text. 
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the cases judges are asked to decide and the resources the par-
ties bring to the table.  
By altering the behavior of private litigants, special incen-
tives to sue change the cases that courts hear, with important 
consequences for the substance of the law. Mechanisms like fee 
shifts and damage enhancements are designed to—and some-
times do—increase litigation rates. Hearing more cases of the 
same type might lead judges to develop a better understanding 
of, and sympathy for, the claims involved. But the structure of 
the judicial system does not lend itself to such judicial learning. 
Instead, judges are prone to react with hostility to any marked 
increases in the number of claims filed under a given statute, 
especially if they were not favorably inclined toward those 
claims in the first place. The very existence of litigation incen-
tives seems to fuel such hostility, as judges assume that the 
prospect of recovering enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees 
encourages plaintiffs and their attorneys to file weak claims. 
Thus, litigation incentives are not only less valuable than their 
supporters assume; they may in fact be counterproductive. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part 
I provides a brief overview of the purpose and scope of litigation 
incentives. Part II focuses on how special incentives to sue af-
fect the behavior of litigants. By juxtaposing economic theory 
and empirical facts, I show that one-way attorneys’ fee shifts 
and damage enhancements often do not work in the way that 
conventional understandings of litigation incentives would sug-
gest. Part III moves from litigants to judges, highlighting the 
unintended consequences of litigation incentives for legal doc-
trine. I demonstrate the many ways that the content of courts’ 
dockets may influence judicial decisionmaking, and explain 
why increased filing rates are likely to inspire a negative judi-
cial response. By encouraging litigation as an enforcement 
mechanism, I argue, Congress may diminish the substantive 
rights it sought to protect. Legislators and interests groups 
should heed that risk when bargaining over statutory policy. 
I.  WHY ENCOURAGE LITIGATION?   
Congress enacts legislation, but it does not enforce or in-
terpret it.8 Instead, Congress relies on other actors to imple-
ment the statutes it creates. The power to “execute” the law lies 
 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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with the executive branch,9 and executive-branch actors—
typically administrative agencies—have a central role in en-
forcing federal legislation.10 Statutory interpretation likewise 
happens outside of Congress. Congress rarely enacts perfectly 
specified legislation. Statutory language may be vague or am-
biguous because legislators agree on general principles but not 
on particulars,11 or because legislators hope to take credit for 
addressing a pressing social problem while avoiding blame 
from constituents disappointed with the details.12 Even if legis-
lators wish to control policy as much as possible, uncertainty 
about future events may make perfect specification unwise or 
impossible.13 Often, the best that Congress can do is to enact a 
general policy and leave the fine points to others who can in-
terpret the statute in light of current conditions. Again, Con-
gress typically vests such interpretive authority in administra-
tive agencies. Agencies can develop the expertise necessary to 
understand how complex regulatory schemes work on the 
ground.14 Unlike Congress, moreover, agencies can adjust their 
 
 9. Id. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed”). 
 10. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Ad-
ministrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“In many profound ways, 
the innumerable activities of everyday life—working, traveling, transacting, 
recreating, indeed eating, drinking, and breathing—are affected by the work 
product of federal administrative agencies . . . .”). 
 11. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative 
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 595 (2002) (dis-
cussing the prevalence of “deliberate [statutory] ambiguity,” and reporting 
that congressional staffers “viewed deliberate ambiguity . . . as justified by the 
felt need for action or the perceived threat that inflexible political positions 
would thwart passage of any bill at all”); David B. Spence, A Public Choice 
Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 406, 432–33 (2002) 
(“Slender majorities of both houses of Congress may favor legislation aimed at 
a new policy goal, but different subsets of those slender majorities may oppose 
some of the particulars in each potential approach to achieving that goal.”). 
 12. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 568 
(2009) (“Congress might aim to write just enough policy to receive a positive 
response for its actions, while deflecting any negative attention for the bur-
densome details to the agency.”). 
 13. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Pow-
er: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987) (“Given the 
nature and level of governmental intervention that Congress now authorizes, 
it could not possibly make the hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of important 
policy decisions that agencies make annually.”). 
 14. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine 
and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 947, 967 (1999) (“[T]he executive branch is filled (or can be filled) with 
policy experts who can run tests and experiments, gather data, and otherwise 
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interpretations relatively easily, making for more flexible and 
responsive policy.15  
Reliance on agencies for enforcement and interpretation 
carries with it certain risks. Agencies are subject to significant 
influence by the President, whose policy goals may differ from 
those of Congress.16 Research has shown that agency behavior, 
particularly in the realm of enforcement, often changes as pres-
idential administrations change.17 Agencies also are subject to 
influence and control by future Congresses, which might have 
different commitments and priorities from those of the legisla-
tive coalition that enacted the statute in question.18 The result 
 
determine the wisest course of policy, much more so than can 535 members of 
Congress and their staff.”). 
 15. Id. at 954 (noting that “one of the primary reasons for delegating” is 
“the ability of agencies to respond flexibly to changing conditions”). 
 16. The President appoints agency heads (subject to the advice and con-
sent of the Senate), and—with the exception of so-called independent agen-
cies—can remove them from their offices. Modern presidents also have exer-
cised control through executive orders requiring review of proposed agency 
actions and regulatory plans by the executive Office of Management and 
Budget and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. See Nicholas 
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (2006) (arguing that the requirements of cen-
tralized review provide the President with a powerful tool to shape agency pol-
icy); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281–
309 (2001) (describing how President Clinton used administrative oversight to 
promote desired policy ends). For a discussion of President Reagan’s Executive 
Order 12,498, which was adopted until recently by subsequent Presidents, see 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995). For a discussion of President George W. Bush’s Ex-
ecutive Order 13,422, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 701–02 (2007). 
 17. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Del-
egate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 
414–17 (2010) (describing shifts in the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission’s (EEOC) enforcement practices during the Reagan Administration, 
and showing that the agency’s interpretive approach proved to be less suscept-
ible to presidential manipulation); Terry Moe, Regulatory Performance and 
Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 207–21 (1982) (finding 
variation in the enforcement efforts of the National Labor Relations Board, the 
Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission based 
on the presidential administration in office); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Water-
man, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 801, 806–21 (1991) (finding significant executive influence on the behavior 
of seven agencies, especially those situated within executive departments). 
 18. See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 784–87 (1999) (discussing various ave-
nues for congressional control of the bureaucracy). 
  
788 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:782 
 
is that agencies may implement statutes in a way that pushes 
policy away from the preferences of the enacting legislators.19  
For legislators concerned about policy drift, one option is to 
look beyond agencies to other potential enforcers and interpre-
ters. Congress can delegate primary interpretive and/or en-
forcement authority to courts rather than agencies.20 Congress 
also can utilize the help of ordinary citizens by authorizing or 
encouraging them to sue statutory violators.21 Although private 
parties do not exercise formal governmental authority, they 
nevertheless can play an important role in enforcing the law 
through litigation.  
So-called private enforcement of federal law offers several 
advantages over enforcement by agencies. Private enforcement 
can supplement public efforts, picking up the slack where agen-
cy resources run out.22 Private enforcement may be especially 
valuable in areas where statutory violations are hard to detect; 
individuals and firms may have access to information that is 
inaccessible to enforcement agencies.23 An additional benefit, 
from Congress’s perspective, is that private enforcement runs 
 
 19. See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congres-
sional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62–
63 (1995) (discussing the problem of “bureaucratic drift”); David Epstein & 
Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Dis-
cretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699–702 (1994) (same). 
 20. See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory 
Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982); 
Lemos, supra note 17; Lemos, supra note 5; Matthew C. Stephenson, Legisla-
tive Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between 
Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006). 
 21. Alternatively, Congress can empower states to enforce federal law. See 
Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685458. 
 22. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural At-
tack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private At-
torney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2007) (“[P]rivate enforcement 
avoids the need for a large governmental enforcement apparatus . . . .”); Stew-
art & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1214 (“Public enforcement is . . . frequently 
inadequate because of budget constraints; private actions can be a useful sup-
plementary remedy by providing additional enforcement resources.”). 
 23. Bucy, supra note 1, at 4–5 (“[A] public regulatory system will always 
lack the one resource that is indispensable to effective detection and deter-
rence of complex economic wrongdoing: inside information. . . . Private justice 
can supply the resource of inside information.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing 
Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement 
of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1387 (2000) (noting that a central-
ized enforcement scheme loses out on “the eyes, experiences, motivation, and 
resources of millions of Americans who bear witness to institutionalized 
wrongdoing and are willing to endure the expense of rooting it out”). 
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on “autopilot”: it chugs along, fueled by the financial, emotion-
al, or ideological incentives of those injured by statutory viola-
tions, without the need for government intervention.24 As such, 
and unlike enforcement by agencies, private enforcement tends 
to be unaffected by changes in presidential administration.25  
Merely authorizing private enforcement may not result in 
the desired level of enforcement, however. Although American 
society frequently is denounced as excessively litigious, the re-
ality is that only a tiny fraction of those who encounter poten-
tially justiciable problems consult a lawyer, much less sue.26 
Litigation is expensive, and the benefits to the individual plain-
tiff may not be worth the costs. That is so even if the overall 
benefits from the lawsuit would be substantial. Litigation often 
generates positive externalities that will be shared widely by 
all, or at least many, citizens. For instance, environmental 
suits can lead to cleaner air and water; antitrust suits to more 
competition and lower prices; and civil rights suits to better po-
 
 24. Farhang, Congressional Mobilization, supra note 4, at 5 (“[T]his sticky 
status quo creates an incentive for legislators and their interest group constit-
uents to rely upon private enforcement regimes, which provide a form of auto-
pilot enforcement, via market incentives, that will be difficult for future legis-
lative majorities, or errant bureaucrats pursuing their own goals, to subvert.”). 
 25. Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in 
Private Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over 
Time, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 855, 856 (2006) (“Presidents can alter enforce-
ment by changing the level of regulatory enthusiasm more easily than they 
can alter enforcement by influencing case law.”); Lemos, supra note 17, at 
404–18 (showing that the ideological direction of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Title VII cases was not linked to the politics of the president in office). 
 26. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 136 (2002) (discussing the results of a survey of more 
than five thousand households and reporting that “even for . . . substantial 
grievances, litigation is by no means a knee-jerk or common reaction in Ameri-
ca, as overall only about 5% of the survey’s grievances ultimately resulted in a 
court filing”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Compara-
tive Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 143 (2010) (explaining that Americans who expe-
rience potentially litigable problems are relatively less likely to obtain legal 
advice than residents of other countries); David Luban, A Flawed Case Against 
Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 377 (1998) (“[A]part from automobile-
related injuries, Americans are extremely reluctant to sue. A large ICJ study 
found that claims were made in 44% of motor vehicle injuries, 7% of work-
related injuries, and 3% of other injures—all in all, in about one accidental in-
jury in ten.”); Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: 
Title VII, Print Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 241 (2004) (“Research on the prevalence of discrim-
ination in the workplace . . . demonstrates that more than one-third of those 
who reported unfair treatment took no further action, and only 3% reported 
suing their employer.”). 
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lice practices. Yet, as Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein have 
explained, “[w]hen the social benefits of eliminating an unlaw-
ful activity are widely shared, the stake of any individual is of-
ten small and each individual can enjoy a ‘free ride’ on the en-
forcement efforts of others. As a result, no individual may have 
sufficient incentive to bring suit.”27  
Moreover, few individuals can sue successfully without the 
help of an attorney, and few can afford to pay an attorney out of 
pocket. Attorneys’ fees typically account for most of the cost of 
litigation, and under the American rule for fees, each party 
pays its own attorney regardless of who wins and who loses.28 
Although contingency fee or “no win, no pay” arrangements 
may be available to low-income plaintiffs,29 high litigation costs 
coupled with a low expected recovery can make finding a law-
yer difficult indeed.30 The problem is especially acute in areas 
where relief is likely to come in the form of an injunction rather 
than damages,31 but even monetary claims that are substantial 
from the perspective of the plaintiff may be too small—relative 
to the expense of litigation—to attract an attorney.32  
Recognizing the potential obstacles to private enforcement, 
Congress has taken steps to encourage litigation through mech-
anisms that reduce the cost or increase the expected benefits of 
suit.33 With respect to costs, Congress has carved out excep-
 
 27. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1214 n.72. 
 28. See Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of 
Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 188 (1984) (“The United States 
is the only common law jurisdiction in which attorney fees do not follow the 
event. Absent an express statutory exception, each party must bear the total 
expense of compensating his or her attorney.”). 
 29. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litiga-
tion: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 
1944, 1966–67 (2002) (describing different types of fee arrangements). 
 30. See Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. 
and Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 296 (1999) 
(“[T]he contingency fee does not provide complete access or ideal gatekeeping. 
Meritorious claims with important legal implications but limited pecuniary 
prospects will not be pursued under contingency fee arrangements . . . .”). 
 31. See Zemans, supra note 28 (“[U]nlike large monetary claims that may 
be pursued on a contingency fee basis, suits seeking equitable relief of even a 
very serious nature are inhibited by the anticipated high legal fees.”). 
 32. See Albiston & Nielson, supra note 22, at 1090.  
 33. The focus of this Article is on statute-specific incentives, but it bears 
mentioning that Congress can facilitate litigation through more wholesale 
measures, such as by authorizing class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Ken-
neth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Con-
flict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 49 (1975) (“A key feature of the class ac-
tion is that it holds the potential for making feasible the compensation of the 
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tions from the American rule for attorney’s fees so that success-
ful plaintiffs need not dig into their winnings in order to fund 
their representation. In a comprehensive study of federal litiga-
tion incentives enacted between 1887 to 2004, political scientist 
Sean Farhang found 275 statutes containing one-way fee shifts, 
allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees from 
their adversaries.34 Examples include the Civil Rights Attor-
ney’s Fees Awards Act, which prescribes a fee shift for victo-
rious plaintiffs in a variety of civil rights actions;35 the Privacy 
Act, which shifts fees for plaintiffs who successfully sue a fed-
eral agency for failing to provide adequate access to personal 
records or to maintain those records accurately;36 the Fair Debt 
Collection Act, which prohibits “abusive and deceptive” conduct 
by creditors and contains an automatic fee shift for prevailing 
plaintiffs;37 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
which entitles plaintiffs who prove unlawful discrimination to 
recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.38  
On the other side of the equation, Congress has permitted 
prevailing plaintiffs to recover damages beyond their actual 
losses. Farhang’s study revealed 104 statutes containing dam-
age enhancements,39 either in the form of a multiplier (e.g., 
double or treble damages) or punitive damages.40 A court may 
 
victims of mass wrongs even though each victim has a loss that is too small to 
justify an individual action.”); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, 
Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 475 (“Class actions 
are, at their root, an aggregation device for separate claims . . . .”); Myriam 
Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: 
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 108–31 
(2006) (discussing the compensation justification for class actions). 
 34. FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 66. The precise lan-
guage of statutory fee shifts varies, but a common formulation is that fees may 
(or must) be awarded to “prevailing part[ies].” Although that language sug-
gests that either a victorious plaintiff or defendant may recover attorneys’ 
fees, courts consistently have interpreted such statutes in a way that favors 
the plaintiff. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 22, at 1093 n.24 (“Courts gen-
erally interpret ‘prevailing party’ fee-shifting statutes to permit asymmetrical 
recovery: Prevailing plaintiffs generally recover fees as a matter of course, but 
prevailing defendants recover their fees only when the plaintiff ’s action was 
‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’” (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. 
v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978))). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2006). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (2006). 
 39. FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 66. 
 40. See id. at 62–65. 
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award treble damages, for example, for violations of antitrust,41 
racketeering,42 and intellectual property protection statutes;43 
and punitive damages are available to plaintiffs who sue suc-
cessfully under statutes prohibiting discrimination in hous-
ing,44 employment,45 and the provision of credit.46 Another form 
of damage enhancement is a qui tam provision, which permits 
plaintiffs who have not been injured to share in an award. A 
prominent example is the False Claims Act, which encourages 
individuals to come forward with information about fraud 
against the government by promising them part of any even-
tual government recovery.47 Finally, statutory damages can in 
some circumstances serve as an enhancement if they exceed the 
amount of actual damages. Statutory damages are available in 
several statutes prohibiting violations of privacy, for example, 
where actual damages are difficult to prove.48 
As these examples suggest, Congress has provided for one-
way fee shifts and enhanced damages in a wide variety of con-
texts, ranging from consumer protection to communications to 
civil rights. Farhang’s study makes clear that litigation incen-
tives “are not the unique province of any particular ideological 
or partisan program.”49 They have been deployed by Democrat-
ic- and Republican-controlled Congresses alike, although Dem-
 
 41. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 42. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964(c) (2006). 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006) (providing for treble damages for the use of 
a counterfeit trademark); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (allowing for treble damages 
for willful patent infringement).  
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2006). 
 45. Id. § 1981a(b) (allowing punitive damages to be available up to 
$300,000, depending on the size of the employer); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(e)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2010) (making available to Title VII claimants “any re-
lief authorized by section 1981a of [the] title”). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (2006) (authorizing punitive damages up to $10,000). 
 47. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006).  
 48. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2006) (stating that “any person whose wire, 
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally 
used in violation of ” the Act can, under certain circumstances, recover statuto-
ry and punitive damages); id. § 2707(c) (providing for statutory and punitive 
damages for unauthorized access to stored electronic communications such as 
e-mail); Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statuto-
ry Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 110 (2009) (“[S]tatutory 
damages provide an incentive to pursue a lawsuit where actual damages are 
small or difficult to ascertain.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 49. FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 67–68. 
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ocratic majorities are somewhat more likely to make use of pri-
vate enforcement regimes than Republican ones.50  
The obvious purpose of statutory provisions like one-way 
fee shifts and enhanced damages is to promote compliance with 
federal law by making violations more costly. Potential viola-
tors will weigh the benefits of law-breaking against the ex-
pected penalty, which can be understood as the amount of 
damages multiplied by the probability that any given violator 
will be found liable and forced to pay. The higher the expected 
penalty, the greater the deterrent effect the penalty will have. 
A one-way fee shift permits more people to sue to enforce the 
relevant statute, thereby increasing the likelihood that viola-
tors will face sanctions. A damage enhancement raises the 
amount of damages available, and so should deter violations 
even if the rate of litigation stays the same.51 But damage en-
hancements also encourage more private litigation by offering 
plaintiffs and their attorneys a larger recovery.52  
Thus, both mechanisms “work”—at least in part—by boost-
ing litigation.53 The legislative histories of statutes that contain 
 
 50. Id. at 229–30. Farhang found that Congress’s use of litigation incen-
tives was positively and statistically significantly associated with divided gov-
ernment and with the risk of electoral losses. Id. at 79. Those findings provide 
important empirical support for the notion, discussed above, that legislators 
will turn to private enforcement when they have reason to fear that public en-
forcement will be skewed by an ideologically distant president, or by future 
Congresses controlled by the other party. Id. at 5 (“[C]onflict between Con-
gress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, a perennial feature of 
the American state, creates incentives for Congress to bypass the bureaucracy 
and provide for enforcement via private litigation.”); Joseph L. Smith, Con-
gress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes to Judicial Review Un-
der the Clean Air Act, 58 POL. RES. Q. 139, 140 (2005) (“[J]udicial review pro-
visions are tools of inter-branch conflict. By expanding the powers of courts to 
supervise regulatory agencies, Congress transfers authority from the executive 
branch to the courts.”). 
 51. Indeed, a conventional justification for enhanced damages is that a 
damage multiplier is needed in order to account for the fact that only a frac-
tion of offenders are sanctioned. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Sha-
vell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 
(1998) (“[I]f the harm is $100,000 and there is a twenty-five percent chance 
that the injurer will be found liable for the harm for which he is legally re-
sponsible, the harm should be multiplied by . . . 4, so total damages should be 
$400,000. Because the injurer will pay this amount every fourth time he gener-
ates harm, his average payment will be $100,000 (= $400,000/4). Thus, on av-
erage, the injurer will pay for the harm he causes, and appropriate deterrence 
will result.”). 
 52. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 53. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 62 (arguing that 
one-way fee shifts and enhanced damages are “unambiguous in their purpose 
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litigation incentives are replete with statements by legislators 
and witnesses that optimal enforcement depends on private lit-
igation, and that some form of inducement is necessary in order 
to facilitate suit.54 Interest groups, including legal advocacy 
 
and influence”). That is not to say that encouraging litigation is the only goal 
of such mechanisms, which may serve compensatory purposes as well. See, 
e.g., William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The 
New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 406 (1985) (noting that one of the purpos-
es of private antitrust enforcement is to compensate parties injured by anti-
trust violations); Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 2039, 2044–45 (1993) (explaining that one-way fee shifting may help “en-
sure more complete compensation for parties injured by government wrong-
doing or by the failure of private entities to comply with governmental direc-
tives”). Moreover, damage enhancements may be designed to promote 
voluntary compliance, thereby reducing the need for litigation. See infra notes 
90–92 and accompanying text.  
 54. See, e.g., FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 4 (“Legislators 
and the interest groups that influenced their behavior, with a high degree of 
self-consciousness, and centrally motivated by policy goals, constructed Title 
VII’s enforcement provisions with the objective of mobilizing private litigants 
to execute the enforcement function in court.”); Eugene R. Gaetke & Robert G. 
Schwemm, Government Lawyers and Their Private “Clients” Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 334–35 (1997) (discussing the legis-
lative history of the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act); Haeji Hong, 
Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v. Chao, 
38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 103 (2005) (“Congress included the civil remedy provi-
sion to encourage private enforcement of the Privacy Act. Recognizing that 
federal agencies have little incentives to enforce the Privacy Act, Congress in-
tended to provide incentives for the ‘widest possible citizen enforcement.’” 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 83 (1974), reprinted in JOINT COMM. ON GOV’T 
OPERATIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: SOURCE 
BOOK ON PRIVACY 236 (1976))); Vickie J. Williams, Dead Men Telling Tales: A 
Policy-Based Proposal for Survivability of Qui Tam Actions Under the Civil 
False Claims Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1073, 1081–82 (2005) (discussing the legis-
lative history of the 1986 amendments to the Civil False Claims Act, and ar-
guing that Congress enhanced the recovery available under the Act in order to 
encourage private suits); Darren A. Craig, Note, Actions Founded on Statutory 
Liability: Adopting a Limitations Period for Attorneys’ Fees Actions Brought 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 79 IND. L.J. 493, 495 
(2004) (discussing the legislative history behind Congress’s addition of a one-
way fee shift to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Anne M. Mel-
len, Note, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act: Egregious Litiga-
tion Conduct in the “Exceptional” Case, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1111, 1115–16 
(2006) (discussing the legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Lan-
ham Act, which added a provision for shifting attorneys’ fees to prevailing par-
ties in “exceptional” cases); Andrew Robert Schein, Note, Attorney Fees for Pro 
Se Plaintiffs Under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, 63 B.U. L. 
REV. 443, 444 (1983) (explaining that Congress added a fee-shift to the Free-
dom of Information Act in order to encourage citizen enforcement by removing 
economic barriers to litigation).  
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groups, often lobby for such provisions.55 Just as Congress can 
craft agency procedures in a way that “stack[s] the deck” in fa-
vor of certain constituencies,56 it can use fee shifts and damage 
enhancements in an effort to ensure that particular individuals 
or groups have the ability and incentive to enforce federal legis-
lation. Not surprisingly, the legislators who support litigation 
incentives tend to be the same people who champion the poli-
cies embodied in the relevant bill.57 Legislators vote for such 
procedural mechanisms in the belief that they will help pro-
mote the substance of the statute.  
Although litigation incentives are commonplace in federal 
statutory law, it is not at all clear how they function in practice. 
In Part II, I consider how one-way fee shifts and enhanced 
damages affect the behavior of litigants. In Part III, I consider 
their likely effect on judicial decisionmaking and the law. 
II.  CONSEQUENCES FOR LITIGANT BEHAVIOR   
Do litigation incentives in fact generate more lawsuits 
seeking to enforce federal statutory law? In this Part, I ap-
proach that question from two perspectives, one theoretical and 
the other empirical. From the perspective of standard economic 
theory, the answer is straightforward: all else equal, enhanced 
damages and one-way fee shifts should lead to more complaints 
being filed. Yet the available empirical evidence provides only 
partial support for that theoretical prediction. It is fairly clear 
that enhanced damages result in higher filing rates at least 
some of the time, but there is very little evidence that one-way 
fee shifts have the same effect.  
 
 55. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 79 (reporting that 
“the presence of more witnesses representing issue-oriented citizen groups in 
hearings on regulatory legislation is associated with increased enactment of 
private enforcement regimes”); Zemans, supra note 28, at 200 (noting that 
Congress has not encouraged litigation “in any systematic fashion. Instead, it 
appears that legislative action on this issue as on any other, has been depend-
ent upon the persuasion of interested parties”). 
 56. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instru-
ments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 267–68 (1987). 
 57. See Smith, supra note 50, at 140 tbl.1 (showing that, at three stages of 
the amendment of the Clean Air Act, supporters of stricter protection for the 
environment advocated adding, or strengthening, private litigation incentives, 
while opponents of stricter protection of the environment resisted such provi-
sions). 
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A. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Given that only a small fraction of disputes result in litiga-
tion, what makes some people decide to sue and others to “lump 
it?”58 Law and economics scholars have argued that the deci-
sion to sue can be understood largely in financial terms. On 
that view, a potential plaintiff will sue if the expected value of 
litigation outweighs the cost.59 The expected value of litigation 
is the amount of damages (or other relief) the plaintiff expects 
to recover if she prevails, multiplied by the probability that she 
will win.60 Thus, if the plaintiff believes she has a seventy per-
cent chance of recovering a $10,000 judgment, the expected 
value of litigation is $7000. The plaintiff ’s costs are simply the 
expense of litigation (filing fees, foregone wages, etc.) plus her 
attorney’s fees. In this example, so long as the plaintiff ’s antic-
ipated legal costs are less than $7000, it would be rational for 
her to sue. 
Litigation incentives such as enhanced damages and one-
way fee shifts change the cost-benefit calculus and should theo-
retically lead to more litigation. Enhanced damages raise the 
expected value of litigation by increasing the amount of the 
judgment. For example, if our hypothetical plaintiff is consider-
ing filing suit under a statute with mandatory treble damages, 
she can expect to recover $30,000 in damages rather than 
$10,000. If she continues to believe that she has a seventy per-
cent chance of prevailing, then the expected value of the litiga-
tion will be $21,000, rather than $7000. Plainly, the likelihood 
that the expected value of the litigation will exceed the cost—
and therefore that this plaintiff will decide to sue—is signifi-
cantly higher than in the original example.61  
 
 58. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know 
and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and 
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 14 (1983) (“Even where injuries are per-
ceived, a common response is resignation, that is, ‘lumping it.’”). 
 59. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical 
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982) (“[U]nder the American system, the plaintiff will 
bring suit if and only if his expected judgment would be at least as large as his 
legal costs.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 60. Mathematically, the expected value of the litigation for the plaintiff 
can be understood as Pp(J), where Pp is the plaintiff ’s assessment of the prob-
ability of a plaintiff win, and J is the expected amount of the judgment.  
 61. If enhanced damages are available but not mandatory, as typically is 
the case with punitive damages, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006), the 
plaintiff will have to consider not only the probability of winning the case and 
recovering compensatory damages, but also the probability of winning puni-
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While enhanced damages raise the expected value of litiga-
tion, one-way fee shifts decrease the expected costs and so, 
again, should induce more plaintiffs to file claims.62 Consider 
our original example, where the expected value of litigation is 
$7000. Under the American rule for fees, if the potential plain-
tiff anticipates that her attorney’s fees will run to $9000 if the 
case goes to trial, she will not sue.63 Her decision will be differ-
ent if the statute in question permits prevailing plaintiffs to re-
cover their attorneys’ fees. Recall that this plaintiff believes she 
has a seventy percent chance of prevailing if she sues. It follows 
that she has only a thirty percent chance of holding the bill for 
her attorney’s fees. Accordingly, under a one-way fee-shifting 
statute, her expected legal costs are $2700—or thirty percent of 
$9000—and she will sue.64 
 
tive damages. Her computation will involve an additional step, but the result 
will be the same: even a relatively small probability of recovering punitive 
damages will increase the expected value of litigation over the traditional ac-
tual-damages model, and hence will increase the likelihood of suit. 
 62. It bears emphasis that the analysis here focuses on one-way fee shifts, 
under which a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorneys’ fees but a prevailing 
defendant typically cannot. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Com-
mentators agree that a one-way fee shift should—in theory, and with other 
factors held constant—increase the number of claims filed. See, e.g., Krent, 
supra note 53, at 2040 (explaining that fewer suits should arise under a sys-
tem without fee shifting); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4 (“[T]he fee-
shifting statute, by allowing plaintiffs to avoid incurring attorney’s fees if they 
prevail, increases the proportion of disputes that plaintiffs are willing to bring 
as lawsuits.”); Shavell, supra note 59, at 60–61 (noting that the frequency of 
suit will be highest under a fee-shifting system favoring the plaintiff ). The ef-
fects of a two-way fee shift (also known as the “English Rule” for fees), see, e.g., 
Kritzer, supra note 29, at 1946, under which any prevailing party can recover 
fees, are far less clear. Id. at 1948 (“There is surprisingly little agreement 
among those who have undertaken . . . theoretical analyses [of the effects of 
the American versus English fee systems, and] the empirical literature con-
firms that the effects of fee shifting are complex and difficult to ascertain.”). 
 63. That is so even if the plaintiff is suing in an area where “no win, no 
pay” arrangements are available, as a plaintiff focused on economic factors (as 
the theory assumes) will not pursue litigation if her entire recovery will be eat-
en up in attorneys’ fees. On the other hand, the plaintiff in a “strike suit”—a 
meritless suit brought in the hope of extracting a settlement from the defend-
ant—might sue even when the cost of going to trial exceeds the expected re-
covery, because she will never plan on going to trial. See D. Rosenberg & S. 
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985). 
 64. Note that the effects of a one-way fee shift are greatest when the 
plaintiff is optimistic about her chances of success. The more confident the 
plaintiff is that she will win, the more she will discount the expected costs of 
her legal representation. Thus, not only should one-way fee shifts encourage 
more claims, they should encourage relatively stronger claims. See Keith N. 
Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427, 445 
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The economic model of litigation is stylized, of course. It 
assumes that plaintiffs are rational utility maximizers, that 
they are risk neutral,65 and that their litigation decisions are 
driven exclusively by economic concerns and not, for example, a 
desire for revenge or to have a “day in court.”66 If real plaintiffs 
do not share those characteristics, or if other factors intervene 
that skew the litigation decision, then litigation incentives may 
not have their intended effect.67  
Unfortunately, there is relatively little empirical evidence 
regarding the actual consequences of enhanced damages and 
one-way fee shifts. Although such incentives can be found in 
hundreds of statutes, most were enacted at the same time that 
Congress created the private cause of action. In such circums-
tances, it is impossible to tell whether the relevant incentives 
altered the quantity or quality of litigation that would have oc-
curred in their absence. In a handful of statutes, however, Con-
gress created a private cause of action and then added a fee 
shift and/or damage enhancement some years later. Those stat-
utes provide an opportunity to gauge the effects of litigation in-
centives by comparing the rate of filings before and after the re-
levant amendments. To that end, I canvassed existing studies 
of the amended statutes in an effort to determine whether the 
litigation incentives made a difference. This Part now turns to 
a review of the available evidence. 
B. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Very few studies have investigated the effects of litigation 
incentives directly; most of the studies discussed in this Part 
focused on other issues. Nevertheless, they provide useful in-
sights about how fee shifts and damage enhancements have op-
 
(1995) (“[U]nlike the American rule, and like the [English] rule, the Pro-
plaintiff rule gives the greatest amount of encouragement to high probability 
claims.”); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 747 (“A [one-way] fee-shifting 
statute may affect not only the volume of litigation but also the quality of the 
claims brought. . . . The fee-shifting statute has the greatest effect on cases 
that the plaintiff is most likely to win . . . .”).  
 65. See Shavell, supra note 59, at 57, 61 (explaining how the calculations 
change if the potential plaintiff is risk averse rather than risk neutral). 
 66. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 19–23 (2000) (discussing litigants’ noneconomic motives). 
 67. See Farhang, Congressional Mobilization, supra note 4, at 7–8 (“To-
gether, the individual-level effects of noneconomic motives, bounded rationali-
ty, and media distortion, coupled with the effects of broad gauged cultural and 
socioeconomic forces, may dilute the effects of legislative manipulation of ex-
pected value to the vanishing point.”). 
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erated in practice. The results are somewhat surprising. While 
there is empirical support for the notion that enhanced damag-
es increase filing rates, the evidence with respect to one-way 
fee shifts is at best inconclusive, and could be read to suggest 
that fee shifts do not serve their intended purpose of encourag-
ing litigation.68 
1. Enhanced Damages 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a useful 
window onto the consequences of enhanced damages as a suit-
booster. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on 
the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion. As enacted, 
the statute provided that plaintiffs whom prevailed could re-
cover only equitable relief, such as back pay, job seniority, and 
benefits (as well as a reasonable attorney’s fee). Thus, an em-
ployee who was denied a promotion for discriminatory reasons 
could recover only the difference between her existing salary 
 
 68. The effect of litigation incentives on the parties’ choice between set-
tlement and trial is even less clear. Economic theory predicts that damage en-
hancements would lead to fewer settlements between risk-neutral parties. See 
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65, 67 n.8 (1977) (explaining that “litigation is 
more likely than settlement where, ceteris paribus, the stakes of a case are 
greater” because “for a given distribution of the parties’ subjective probabili-
ties of winning, greater stakes lead to greater differences between plaintiffs’ 
minimum settlement offers and defendants’ maximum settlement offers”). 
Economic theory also predicts more settlements where at least one of the par-
ties is risk-averse. See Jeffrey M. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements and Trial 
Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 401, 408 (1996) ( “[T]he size of the risk aver-
sion effect increases with the size of damages awarded . . . .”). All else being 
equal, a one-way fee shift should (marginally) reduce the rate of settlement in 
cases where both parties are optimistic about their chances of winning at trial. 
See Shavell, supra note 59, at 67 (“There will be a greater likelihood of litiga-
tion under [a one-way fee shift system] than under the American system be-
cause (when the plaintiff ’s estimate of the chances of prevailing exceeds the 
defendant’s) the joint expected legal costs tend to be lower under [that system] 
than the joint costs under the American system.”). Empirical evidence on set-
tlements is hard to come by, in part because many settlements are confiden-
tial, and in part because it is much easier to collect data on case outcomes 
than on settlements. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is 
the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care? 5–6 (Cornell Legal Studies, Re-
search Paper No. 08-30, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1276383 
(noting the limitations of settlement-rate statistics based on outcomes); cf. 
Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Em-
ployment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 113 (2007) 
(“[E]mployment discrimination settlements are almost uniformly governed by 
private contracts containing confidentiality clauses.”). What little evidence is 
available regarding the connection between settlement and litigation incen-
tives is therefore inconclusive. 
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and the salary she would have received had she been promoted, 
and a plaintiff who suffered sexual harassment but remained in 
her job typically could recover nothing at all. In the 1991 
amendments to Title VII, Congress substantially increased the 
amount of damages available for intentional discrimination, 
permitting prevailing plaintiffs to recover any economic dam-
ages they suffered as a result of unlawful discrimination, as 
well as non-economic damages (e.g., for emotional distress) and 
punitive damages in amounts ranging from $50,000 to 
$300,000, depending on the size of the employer.69  
Several studies of employment discrimination litigation 
have found that Title VII litigation in federal court increased 
sharply—nearly tripling in frequency—following the 1991 
amendments, at a time when other civil litigation rates stayed 
flat or declined.70 These authors hypothesized that the increase 
was due, at least in part, to the 1991 amendments, but they did 
not attempt to confirm that claim through formal statistical 
analysis.71 Sean Farhang’s study of claims filed with the Equal 
 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006).  
 70. Relying on data provided by the Administrative Office of the Federal 
Courts (AO), Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab report that “employment 
discrimination cases exploded from 8,303 cases terminated in 1991 to 23,722 
cases terminated in 1998, a 286% increase.” Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to 
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 116 (2009). Using the same data, Mi-
chael Selmi has shown that employment discrimination litigation doubled be-
tween 1991 and 1994, with “the rise in cases . . . felt most acutely in 1994,” 
which “marked the time when post-1991 cases would most likely emerge from 
the administrative process.” Selmi, supra note 1, at 1435–36. Both studies fo-
cus on litigation concerning employment discrimination generally, because the 
most specific category available for study is what the AO classifies as Code 
#442, “Civil Rights: Jobs” or “Employment.” See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, su-
pra, at 104 n.4 (explaining the relevant classification system). That category 
includes Title VII cases as well as litigation under other antidiscrimination 
statutes. Id. But Title VII cases account for nearly seventy percent of the cases 
in the category, suggesting that Title VII claims did increase after 1991. See 
id. at 115–17 (noting “across-the-board” increases in employment discrimina-
tion caseloads). That implication finds support in a study by Laura Beth Niel-
sen, Robert Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster, who examined the files from a ran-
dom sample of 2100 cases involving claims of employment discrimination. 
Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment 
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States (Am. Bar Found. Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 08-04, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1093313. Nielsen and her co-authors report that employment discrimination 
litigation nearly tripled between 1992 and 1997, and that the increase is due 
in part to increased filings by Title VII claimants. Id. at 13–14, 41 fig.1. 
 71. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70 (observing the correlation 
without attempting to prove causation); Nielsen et al., supra note 70, at 14 
(reporting that employment discrimination cases increased sharply after 1991 
  
2011] SPECIAL INCENTIVES TO SUE 801 
 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provides more 
direct evidence of the influence of the 1991 amendments.72 Be-
fore a plaintiff can file suit in court under Title VII, she must 
file a claim with the EEOC, giving the agency an opportunity to 
investigate and perhaps conciliate the claim.73 Thus, every 
claim that results in litigation must pass through the EEOC. 
Farhang found that Title VII claims rose dramatically after 
1991.74 After controlling for other factors that could have 
sparked an increase in claim filing in the 1990s (such as unem-
ployment and bureaucratic ideology), Farhang concluded that 
the effect of the 1991 amendments was positive and statistical-
ly significant.75  
Litigation under the Fair Housing Act has followed a simi-
lar pattern. As enacted in 1968, the Fair Housing Act provided 
that the victims of discrimination in housing could recover ac-
tual damages and up to $1000 in punitive damages. Because 
“out-of-pocket damages in most housing cases are de minimis,” 
litigation rates remained relatively low.76 Congress responded 
in 1988, when it amended the Act to remove the cap on punitive 
 
and reasoning that “it appears that the expansion of rights and remedies was 
having its intended effect,” though the precise cause of the increase remains 
unknown); Selmi, supra note 1, at 1435–36 (discussing the strong possibility 
that the increase resulted from the 1991 amendments, while not attempting to 
statistically verify it). Clermont and Schwab point out that the rate of unem-
ployment was decreasing during the 1990s as the number of employment dis-
crimination claims shot up, concluding that “[b]usiness cycles do not explain 
the upward trend in cases during the 1990s.” Clermont & Schwab, supra note 
70, at 119–20. Similarly, Selmi found that the level of government activity in 
enforcing the relevant statutes decreased in the 1990s, and reasoned that, “[i]f 
general economic conditions were responsible for the surge in [private] court 
filings, we would expect the government cases to have increased at a rate simi-
lar to the private bar.” Selmi, supra note 1, at 1437. 
 72. Farhang, Congressional Mobilization, supra note 4. 
 73. Id. at 16. 
 74. Id. at 17. 
 75. Id. at 26–27. Farhang also compared the rate of claims filed under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which did not undergo similar 
amendment in 1991, and found no similar pattern—suggesting that the post-
1991 “increases in Title VII charges were not driven by broader social or legal 
factors affecting employment discrimination claiming in general, and [but-
tressing] the inference that the true cause was [the 1991 amendments to Title 
VII].” Id. at 27. 
 76. Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 380 (1988); id. at 381 (“The result is that relatively 
few fair housing cases are filed.”); Selmi, supra note 1, at 1404 n.9 (noting that 
although limited damages were available pre-1988, “prevailing plaintiffs ob-
tained damages that were so low as to provide almost no deterrent effect”).  
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damages.77 As Fair Housing Act litigation became more profit-
able, litigation rates shot up. Between 1984 and 1988, an aver-
age of 254 private cases were filed each year.78 The filing rate 
increased mildly by 1990, when 284 private cases were in-
itiated.79 By 1996, the annual filing rate had reached 829 cases, 
an “increase of nearly 200% over the 1990 level of activity.”80  
The qui tam provision of the False Claims Act provides an 
additional example. Enacted in 1863 in response to charges of 
widespread military procurement fraud during the Civil War,81 
the qui tam provision permits a private citizen, or “relator,” 
with evidence of fraud against the United States to bring a civil 
action against the wrongdoer on behalf of the government.82 
The False Claims Act was amended in 1986, making it easier—
and more lucrative—for relators to sue.83 Most relevant here, 
the 1986 amendments increased the available penalties from 
double to triple damages, and increased the relator’s recovery 
for a successful suit to up to thirty percent if the government 
does not intervene and twenty-five percent if it does.84 The 
amendments worked. Prior to 1986, the Department of Justice 
received approximately six qui tam cases each year.85 That 
number rose into the hundreds after the 1986 amendments, as 
a total of 4704 qui tam cases were filed between 1986 and Sep-
tember 2004, resulting in $8.4 billion in recovery for the gov-
ernment.86  
 
 77. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 813(c), 
102 Stat. 1619, 1633–34 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2006)). 
 78. Selmi, supra note 1, at 1419 n.72. 
 79. Id. at 1418. 
 80. Id. at 1418–19.  
 81. See Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the 
Public Interest, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 953 (2007). 
 82. After a relator files a claim with the government, the government has 
sixty days to decide whether to intervene. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006). If the 
government decides not to proceed, the relator can conduct the suit alone. Id. 
§ 3730(b)(4)(B). In either case, the relator receives a share of the recovery. Id. 
§ 3730(d). 
 83. See F. Paul Bland, Why “Qui Tam” Is Necessary, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 4, 
1991, at 13–14, available at 11/4/91 NLJ 13 (Westlaw) (“[A] major reason for 
revitalizing qui tam suits was that public prosecutors did not have the time or 
resources to go after a high proportion of reported significant fraud.”). 
 84. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730(d) (2006). 
 85. See Bucy, supra note 1, at 48. 
 86. See Broderick, supra note 81, at 955; see also Bucy, supra note 1, at 48 
(reporting that 3326 qui tam actions were filed between the effective date of 
the 1986 amendments and October 30, 2000).  
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The patterns of filings under Title VII, the Fair Housing 
Act, and the False Claims Act provide some empirical support 
for the notion that legislative measures that increase the ex-
pected value of litigation also increase the amount of that liti-
gation. It is important, however, not to overstate the strength 
of the available evidence. First, with the exception of Farhang’s 
study of claims filed with the EEOC, none of the studies dis-
cussed here sought to prove empirically that increased litiga-
tion rates were caused by, rather than simply correlated with, 
the availability of enhanced damages. And each of the relevant 
statutory amendments made several changes, in addition to in-
creasing the possible recovery for prevailing plaintiffs, which 
also should fuel litigation rates.87 It would be a mistake, then, 
to ascribe the rise in litigation under the three statutes entirely 
to the new damage enhancements. But while it is impossible to 
pinpoint just how much litigation such incentives produced, the 
empirical evidence is at least consistent with the predictions of 
economic theory. 
Second, damage enhancements can operate in a variety of 
ways—they can be mandatory or discretionary, capped or un-
capped, and can apply across the board or only to certain types 
of claims—and may not always have the same effects in every 
area. For example, studies of trademark litigation show no not-
able change in filing rates after the 1984 amendments to the 
Lanham Act provided for mandatory treble damages for use of 
a counterfeit trademark.88 It is not clear why that provision has 
 
 87. The 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act extended the substan-
tive protections of the Act to claims based on disability and familial status, ex-
tended the statute of limitations, and removed a “financial need” limitation on 
the recovery of attorney’s fees by prevailing plaintiffs. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 
102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)) (amending 
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968)). The 1986 amendments to the False 
Claims Act contained provisions that made it easier for relators to sue. Pub. L. 
No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730) (amending 
Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608 (1943)). For example, the amendments per-
mitted the plaintiff to continue as a party to the claim even if the government 
decided to intervene (31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1)); removed the requirement that 
the court dismiss a claim if the government declined to intervene and the evi-
dence was based on information the government had at the time the claim was 
filed; and provided protection to the relator against retaliatory actions by em-
ployers (31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)). And the 1991 amendments to Title VII, inter 
alia, extended the statute of limitations, adjusted the burden of proof for cer-
tain claims, and provided that Title VII applies extraterritorially. Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)). 
 88. See Intellectual Prop. Inst., Yearly Totals – Mitchell Study on Trade-
mark Litigation, WM. MITCHELL C.L., http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual 
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had such a limited effect, but the example suggests the need for 
more research into how enhanced damages operate in specific 
statutory contexts. Two factors that may be particularly impor-
tant are the average amount of damages preenhancement and 
the average wealth of defendants. Where damages are ample to 
begin with, enhancements may not generate significantly more 
litigation. This may help explain why damage enhancements 
seem to have changed the pace of employment and housing dis-
crimination litigation (where the available damages had been 
very low), but not the number of cases involving counterfeiting 
(where purely compensatory damages tend to be high). Similar-
ly, damage enhancements are unlikely to work if defendants 
cannot pay them. Many counterfeiting defendants are effective-
ly judgment proof, making the promise of treble damages more 
theoretical than real.89 
Finally, it is important to note that damage enhancements 
may “work” without increasing the rate of litigation. In the an-
titrust context, for example—where treble damages are manda-
tory upon a plaintiff win—enhanced damages are justified pri-
marily in terms of deterrence. The problem is not so much that 
plaintiffs would have inadequate incentives to sue in the ab-
sence of an enhancement, but rather that antitrust violations 
are so difficult to detect that the expected penalty for a viola-
tion would be inadequate to deter illegal conduct. Recall that 
firms will weigh the expected gains from anticompetitive con-
duct against the expected costs, taking into account both the 
size of the available penalty and the likelihood of sanction.90 
Where detection is unlikely and violations are lucrative, firms 
will opt to violate the law. One response is to increase the pen-
alty, thereby raising the expected cost of violations even if the 
 
-property/?page=326 (last visited Nov. 30, 2010); see also William M. Landes, 
An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some Preliminary 
Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 771 tbl.3 (2004) (reporting the number of 
trademark trials during different periods and showing a drop in number from 
the 1978–1984 period to the 1985–1989 period). 
 89. See Christopher M. Dolan, Fits over Counterfeiting: Legislative Accom-
plishments and Directions, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 233, 246 (1999) (“The treble damag-
es provision was originally ballyhooed as a superior preventative tool. Howev-
er, time has proved it to be inadequate in terms of prevention. The counterfeiters 
were often judgment proof, or otherwise adept at hiding their resources.”). 
 90. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 673, 690–91 (2010) (arguing in favor of deterrence as the prima-
ry purpose of antitrust enforcement because “[d]ecisionmakers in dominant 
firms will perceive that they are better off not engaging in antitrust violations 
given the likelihood of detection multiplied by the penalty”); supra text accom-
panying note 51. 
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likelihood of detection and sanction remains relatively low.91 
Making violations costly should lead more firms to comply with 
the law voluntarily, just as an astronomical fine for speeding 
will induce drivers to slow down even if the risk of being pulled 
over is small.92 The key point for present purposes is that this 
approach does not depend on more antitrust litigation (or more 
speeding tickets). Indeed, there is good reason to fear that in-
creasing both the size of the penalty and the likelihood of sanc-
tion will result in over-deterrence.93 Thus, it is impossible to 
determine in the abstract whether a damages enhancement is 
working well or poorly if ligation rates go up. 
2. One-Way Fee Shifts 
Although one-way fee shifts theoretically should increase 
the rate of litigation by reducing its cost, the data available on 
the consequences of fee shifting call into question its efficacy in 
that respect. The statute most prominently associated with 
one-way fee shifting provides a unique opportunity for testing 
its effects. The Civil Rights Attorney Fee Awards Act of 1976 
(CRAFAA) made fees available to prevailing plaintiffs in a va-
riety of civil rights actions, including constitutional tort claims 
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.94 Importantly, CRAFAA only 
shifted fees; it did not contain other provisions that might work 
to boost, or depress, the rate of litigation. As such, it offers an 
unusually neat way of testing the effects of a one-way fee shift.  
Stewart Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg have analyzed 
the patterns of constitutional tort litigation, but were unable to 
find any clear evidence that the enactment of CRAFAA in 1976 
 
 91. See William Breit & Kenneth Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
The New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 409 (1985) (“As the probability of ap-
prehension and conviction falls the fine increases to compensate for the fall in 
the expected cost of punishment. This is the intellectual justification for the use 
of multiple damages rather than single damages as a deterrent.”); William M. 
Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 678 
(1983) (“The optimal penalty should equal the net harm to persons other than 
the offender, adjusted upward if the probability of apprehension and convic-
tion is less than one.”). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (concluding that optimal 
policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources). 
 92. See Crane, supra note 90, at 698–702 (describing and critiquing the 
theory that treble damages deter antitrust violations). 
 93. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement 
of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1975) (describing the “overenforcement 
theorem”). 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
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resulted in an increase in filing rates.95 Although civil rights fil-
ings increased by eight percent in the period immediately fol-
lowing CRAFAA’s effective date, Schwab and Eisenberg explain 
that, “[i]n the perspective of the growth of civil rights filings 
over time, . . . the eight percent growth rate for that period 
seems ordinary.”96 Comparing civil rights filings to a control 
group of all private filings, Eisenberg and Schwab find a nine-
percent increase in the relative growth rate of civil rights fil-
ings during the same period following the enactment of the fees 
provision.97 That finding might suggest the influence of 
CRAFAA,98 but the bump is short-lived. Eisenberg and Schwab 
conclude that if “change over a long period is the predicted ef-
fect of a fee-shifting statute, the available data cannot confirm 
it.”99 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) may provide a 
counterexample, but too many factors are involved to permit a 
firm conclusion. The Act permits citizens to request informa-
tion from the government, and provides a private cause of ac-
tion against agencies that wrongfully withhold materials a citi-
zen has requested.100 FOIA was amended in 1974 to provide 
(among other things) that courts may award attorney’s fees to 
plaintiffs who “substantially prevail[].”101 The rate of FOIA liti-
gation “increased dramatically” after 1974.102 But, in addition 
to the fee-shifting provision, the 1974 amendments also con-
tained additional alterations that worked a major change in the 
nature of FOIA’s operation and substantive reach. For example, 
the amendments imposed strict deadlines on agencies, author-
 
 95. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 756–58. The authors note that 
“[t]here is no ‘smoking gun’ case law development that predictably would mask 
the effect of a statute that would otherwise lead to increased filings.” Id. at 766. 
 96. Id. at 758. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (“We cannot reject the existence of any effect of the fees act on fil-
ings because of this crest in the filing rate.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 101. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E). 
 102. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case 
Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY 
L.J. 649, 660 (1984) (“After 1974, the number of FOIA requests and the 
amount of litigation challenging agency denials increased dramatically. In 
1966, the annual costs of administering FOIA requests were projected at 
$50,000. In 1981, the most conservative estimate of FOIA costs government-
wide was $47 million; the Office of Management and Budget’s figure was $250 
million.”); accord Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute 
Resolution, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 & n.40 (1988). 
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ized reviewing courts to inquire into the propriety of agencies’ 
classification decisions, and narrowed several statutory excep-
tions to the required disclosure of requested documents.103 
While it is possible that the fee-shifting provision of the 1974 
amendments contributed to the rise in litigation rates, no study 
to date has sought to isolate its effect. 
The history of litigation under the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act (IDEA) further complicates the story. 
Enacted in 1970 as the Education of the Handicapped Act,104 
IDEA imposes various requirements on states for educating 
children with disabilities. Congress amended the Act in 1975, 
adding procedural protections for disabled children and their 
parents, as well as a private cause of action for parents ag-
grieved by a violation of IDEA’s substantive guarantees.105 In 
1986, Congress added a provision permitting courts, in their 
discretion, to award attorneys’ fees “to the parents or guardian 
of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party.”106 
Studies have shown that the volume of litigation under IDEA 
increased during the 1980s107 and experienced a steep bump in 
1987,108 the year after attorneys’ fees were made available. Im-
portantly, however, it appears that the increase in reported 
IDEA cases may be due to litigation over fees themselves rath-
er than an increase in the number of claims filed. One study 
found that 11.1 percent of all cases reported between 1978 and 
1995 concerned the provision for attorneys’ fees—
 
 103. See Elias Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended 
Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 764–67 (1975) (describing the 
1974 amendments and emphasizing the importance of procedures designed to 
speed agency processes and increase agency responsibility, together with those 
targeted at the cost of litigation). 
 104. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). 
 105. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2) (2006)). 
 106. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)). 
 107. One study found that reported special education decisions in the fed-
eral courts “increased dramatically from the 1970s to the 1990s while the 
overall volume of education litigation in federal courts declined.” Perry A. Zir-
kel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Commentary, Special Education Case Law: An 
Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. LAW REP. 731, 733–34 (2002) (discuss-
ing Perry A. Zirkel, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Update, 114 
EDUC. LAW REP. 341, 348–49 (1997)). It made no effort to explain the jump in 
cases, however, or to break down decisions by statute or by year. 
 108. See SUSAN GORN, WHAT’S HOT, WHAT’S NOT: TRENDS IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LITIGATION 32 fig.14 (1996) (depicting reported decisions in non-
class-action IDEA cases). 
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notwithstanding the fact that the fee-shifting provision did not 
even exist prior to 1986.109 Disputes over attorneys’ fees ac-
counted for more litigation than claims concerning, for exam-
ple, IDEA’s substantive requirement that disabled children be 
placed in the “least restrictive environment”110 (9.4 percent), or 
the responsibility for funding special education (9.6 percent).111 
Indeed, the provision of attorneys’ fees was one of the two most 
frequently litigated issues, second only to “procedural matters” 
such as the statute of limitations, exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, and the admission of evidence.112 
Several factors may explain the apparent failure of one-
way fee shifts to increase the rate of claim filing. One is that 
the cost of litigation, at least in certain areas, may be high 
enough that potential plaintiffs and attorneys are unwilling or 
unable to sink substantial funds into a lawsuit based on a mere 
possibility of recovering them in the end.113 As discussed in the 
following Part, judicially created doctrines limit the availability 
and amount of fee awards.114 And, as the IDEA example illu-
strates, potential plaintiffs and their counsel have to factor in 
the cost of any satellite litigation that may occur over the 
award of fees themselves. The resulting game may not be worth 
 
 109. MELINDA MALONEY & BRIAN SHENKER, THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION 
OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 15 (1995); see also Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-
Legalization of Special Education, 195 EDUC. LAW REP. 35, 36 (2005) (noting the 
“disconcertingly notable residual segment [of cases] addressing attorneys’ fees”). 
 110. MALONEY & SHENKER, supra note 109. 
 111. Id. at 36. 
 112. GORN, supra note 108, at 34 fig.16; MALONEY & SHENKER, supra note 
109, at 1. 
 113. See Bucy, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing environmental statutes with 
one-way fee shifts and explaining that, “[b]ecause of their cost and complexity, 
well-organized and funded groups bring most citizen suits. Although attor-
neys’ and expert witnesses’ fees potentially are available to successful citizen 
suit plaintiffs, paying the up-front costs can be so prohibitive that only well-
funded groups can afford to bring citizen suits.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Kathleen C. Engel, Moving Up the Residential Hierarchy: A Remedy for an Old 
Injury Arising from Housing Discrimination, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153, 1188–90 
(1999) (discussing litigation under the Fair Housing Act and arguing that the 
high cost of litigation combined with relatively low damages awards and set-
tlements and a low plaintiff win rate mean that an attorney “can expect to be 
poorly compensated if she accepts the case”). 
 114. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 191 (discussing re-
strictive judicial interpretations of Title VII’s provision for fees, which result 
in a “judicially constructed mine field through which many attorneys have de-
cided not to travel” (quoting Ray Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff’s Attorney in 
Equal Employment Litigation: A Shakespearian Tragedy, 5 LAB. LAW. 63, 72 
(1989))); infra notes 195–98 and accompanying text. 
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the candle. Another possibility is that potential plaintiffs (as 
opposed to their attorneys) do not focus much on the possibility 
of a fee shift,115 paying more attention to the likely amount or 
consequences of a favorable judgment.116 Potential plaintiffs 
may not even be aware of fee-shifting provisions, especially if 
they have not yet consulted an attorney.117 Still another possi-
bility is that attorneys who typically work on a contingency-fee 
basis (as is common in the civil rights area, for example), do not 
place much value on fee shifts. Such attorneys usually can ex-
pect to be paid if the plaintiff wins, and may not care whether 
the money nominally comes from the plaintiff or the defendant. 
If anything, they may prefer to work without a fee shift so as to 
avoid the risk of costly satellite litigation over any fee award.  
In sum, the available empirical evidence raises doubts 
about the efficacy of one-way fee shifts and damage enhance-
ments. While it is possible that damage enhancements are 
working in the sense of improving voluntary compliance with-
out the need for more litigation, it strains reason to suggest 
that the distant and doubtful prospect of attorneys’ fees has a 
significant effect on deterrence. Plaintiff-side fee shifts work, if 
at all, by generating litigation. Yet there is no evidence that 
they have done that. Paradoxically, there is empirical support 
for the notion that damage enhancements have boosted litiga-
tion rates. But such a boost may be unnecessary from a deter-
rence perspective, and may in fact be undesirable. 
Perhaps even more important, the deterrent value of litiga-
tion incentives is not determined solely by the lobbyists and 
legislators who push them into federal law. Once enacted, 
mechanisms like fee shifts and damage enhancements enter 
the province of judges, whose decisions about the incentives 
themselves—as well as the substantive law in which they are 
embedded—can have significant consequences for would-be en-
forcers. Indeed, judges have the capacity to cancel out the posi-
tive effects of litigation incentives, rendering them ineffective 
 
 115. See Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 780 (“If fee-shifting statutes 
have less than the expected effects, it may be due to differences between the 
attorney-client as an entity and the attorney and client as distinct entities.”). 
 116. Farhang, Congressional Mobilization, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 117. See Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State ‘Equal 
Access to Justice’ Acts?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 582 (1995) (suggesting this 
possibility as a way of explaining the relatively “low utilization of the federal 
[Equal Access to Justice Act] (compared to the estimates made at the time of 
its passage) and the seemingly low number of claims under the state EAJAs in 
the years they have been in effect” (footnote omitted)).  
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at best and counterproductive at worst. Policymakers and 
commentators have ignored that risk, but it may help explain 
why many of the statutory provisions explored here have failed 
to generate litigation. In the remainder of this Article, I explore 
the connection between litigation incentives and judicial deci-
sionmaking in more detail. We have seen how special incen-
tives to sue affect litigants. How do they affect judicial deci-
sionmaking and the law? 
III.  CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LAW   
Part II showed that the link between fee shifts, damage 
enhancements, and litigation rates is complicated and context-
dependent. Nevertheless, it is clear that litigation incentives 
do—or at least may—generate more suits some of the time. The 
proponents of such mechanisms seem to assume that increased 
filing rates will have no effect on judicial decisionmaking. As 
more plaintiffs sue, therefore, more plaintiffs will prevail. This 
Part challenges that assumption. There are several reasons to 
suppose that an uptick in the number of lawsuits filed under a 
given statute will affect how judges interpret and enforce that 
statute. By changing the range of cases that judges hear, litiga-
tion incentives may alter judicial behavior as well as the behav-
ior of private litigants. Far from leading inexorably to a plain-
tiff-friendly set of precedents, heightened litigation rates may 
well push case law in the opposite direction. 
A. HOW CASES AFFECT JUDGES 
Most commentators agree that judges’ decisions are shaped 
by their personal views and life experiences.118 There is a great 
deal of debate about the extent to which judicial decisionmak-
ing is based on “the law” or on judges’ ideology,119 upbring-
 
 118. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and 
Acting—Part I—Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 539, 541–42 (1994) (“Of course every judge brings an enormous back-
ground of knowledge to the bench—both factual and ideological—which will be 
utilized in drawing inferences about facts and making policy on law.”). 
 119. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64–72 (1993) (describing the influence of 
judges’ ideology in the attitudinal model); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological 
Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 
812–13 (1995) (finding an eighty-percent correlation between Supreme Court 
Justices’ ideological values and their votes in civil liberties cases). 
  
2011] SPECIAL INCENTIVES TO SUE 811 
 
ing,120 gender,121 or even breakfast choices.122 Yet virtually eve-
ryone agrees that non legal considerations play some role in the 
work of a judge,123 even if they operate on a wholly subcon-
scious level.124 As Justice Cardozo put it, “[w]e may try to see 
things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never 
see them with any eyes except our own.”125 
One of judges’ major life experiences is, of course, the time 
he or she has spent on the bench. A common theme in the liter-
ature on judicial decisionmaking is that a judge’s prior em-
ployment—e.g., whether he served as a prosecutor or defense 
attorney, or as a legal academic or small-town lawyer—may af-
fect his decisions as a judge.126 But there is no reason to think 
that the impact of work experience ends the moment a judge 
 
 120. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 95–96 (2008) (describing 
studies that show that “in the period 1916 to 1988 a Justice was more likely to 
favor civil rights plaintiffs if he was from the North, if he was from an urban 
area, if his father had not been a government official, or if he had never 
worked as a prosecutor”).  
 121. Researchers have found that gender has an effect on judging that is 
independent of ideology. See Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal 
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 401 (2010); see also Donald 
R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender 
Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 436 (1994) (finding that gender 
plays a role in employment discrimination cases but not in search and seizure 
and obscenity cases). 
 122. The famous adage that the law is what the judge ate for breakfast typ-
ically is attributed to U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank. See Tonja 
Jacobi, The Impact of Positive Political Theory on Old Questions of Constitu-
tional Law and the Separation of Powers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 263 & n.19 
(2006). “[J]udicial decisions might even be determined by ‘what the judge had 
for breakfast.’” Id. at 263. “This phrase is often used to summarize the views of 
the Legal Realists, and is often ascribed to Jerome Frank . . . .” Id. at n.19. 
 123. POSNER, supra note 120, at 47 (“Attitudinalists and legalists disagree 
about the extent of political judging rather than about its existence.”). 
 124. See id. at 65–68 (explaining that “such things as temperament, per-
sonal background characteristics (such as race or sex), life experiences, and 
ideology” can affect judges’ decisions unconsciously); cf. Chris Guthrie et al., 
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779–80 (2001) (finding that 
judges are susceptible to various forms of cognitive errors, and that “wholly 
apart from political orientation and self-interest, the very nature of human 
thought can induce judges to make consistent and predictable mistakes in par-
ticular situations”). 
 125. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
13 (1921). 
 126. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its 
Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. 
REV. 903, 954–56 (2003) (discussing the literature and reporting that seventy 
percent of relevant studies found some sort of a relationship between career 
experience and judicial choices). 
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dons the black robe. Just as a judge’s pre-judicial employment 
helps define who he is as a person—which in turn influences 
how he behaves as a judge—so too will a judge’s experiences on 
the bench.  
Although the link between judicial experience and judicial 
decisionmaking has received surprisingly little scholarly atten-
tion, several studies have found evidence that judicial expe-
rience does indeed make a difference.127 For example, research-
ers have determined that Supreme Court Justices with prior 
service on the bench tend to cast more liberal votes on economic 
issues,128 and on equal protection claims,129 than those without 
judicial experience. Similarly, federal trial judges with prior 
experience on state courts tend to rule for the plaintiff in cases 
involving questions of subjective intent more frequently than 
other judges.130 Few of the studies attempt to explain how or 
why the time spent on the bench affects judges’ decisions, but 
they provide empirical support for the basic intuition that 
 
 127. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS 86 (2007) (finding that appellate judges with prior experience on a 
district court are more likely than their colleagues to affirm district court deci-
sions that depart from their own ideological preferences); Gregory C. Sisk et 
al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judi-
cial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1477–78 (1998) (finding that federal 
district court judges with prior judicial experience at the state/local level were 
more likely than other judges to reject constitutional challenges to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and concluding that “the effect of prior judicial expe-
rience cannot be dismissed in empirical study and bears further investigation 
in other contexts”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial 
Behavior: A Statistical Study 37 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, 
Paper No. 404, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403 (finding 
that, after adjustment for other factors, Supreme Court Justices appointed from 
the courts of appeals are more liberal than other Justices, probably because 
they have been socialized by their judicial experience to respect precedent, and 
the most controversial Supreme Court precedents tend to be more liberal). 
 128. C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Deci-
sions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362–63 (1981); C. Neal Tate & 
Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute 
Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916–88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 
477–78 (1991) (building on prior study and confirming that prior judicial expe-
rience has a significant impact on economic liberalism). 
 129. Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges’ Attributes and Case Characteris-
tics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 
71 JUDICATURE 277, 280–81 (1988).  
 130. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do 
We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1190 (1991) 
(controlling for other case characteristics). 
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judges do not stop evolving as people when they take the oath 
of office.131  
If judges’ decisions are affected by their own experiences as 
judges, it stands to reason that a judge’s views—and ultimately 
her decisions—may be affected by the nature of the cases on 
her docket.132 The job of a judge can vary significantly from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction, and from trial to appellate to supreme 
court. There are significant caseload differences among the fed-
eral courts of appeals, for instance, with the Ninth Circuit 
hearing a disproportionate share of immigration cases133 and 
the District of Columbia Circuit hearing most administrative 
law cases.134 At the trial level, judges’ dockets differ markedly 
in the proportion of criminal and civil cases, and “the types of 
crime that different judges sentence vary widely, with some 
judges sentencing as many as 60 percent violent crimes, and 
 
 131. Additional support can be found in the literature about judicial prefer-
ence change. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court 
Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1486 
(2007) (“[C]ontrary to the received wisdom, virtually every Justice serving 
since the 1930s has moved to the left or right.”); Linda Greenhouse, Justices 
Who Change: A Response to Epstein et al., 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1885, 1885 
(2007) (“For nearly one-third of my tenure on the Supreme Court beat, there 
was no change in the Court’s membership, yet clearly the Court changed be-
tween 1994 and 2005.”); Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the 
Phenomenon of Judicial Preference Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1225–26 
(2005) (discussing growing evidence that judicial preferences might vary signifi-
cantly over time). Interestingly, that literature does not consider the possibility 
that Justices’ experiences as Justices might change their views on certain is-
sues. Instead, it focuses on factors like the “political environment in which the 
Justice operates,” public opinion, and context (i.e., the influence of other Jus-
tices). Epstein et al., supra, at 1520 & n.132. Those factors may well be impor-
tant, but judicial experience warrants a place on the list of possible influences. 
See John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1567 
(2006) (“[L]earning on the job is essential to the process of judging. At the very 
least, I know that learning on the bench has been one of the most important 
and rewarding aspects of my own experience over the last thirty-five years.”). 
 132. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125–
26 (1977) (arguing that state judges may be less likely to enforce federal con-
stitutional rights than their federal counterparts because “[s]tate trial judges, 
. . . especially at the criminal, family, and lower civil court levels, are steadily 
confronted by distasteful and troubling fact patterns which can sorely test ab-
stract constitutional doctrine and foster a jaded attitude toward constitutional 
rights”). 
 133. Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: 
Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979–1990, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
115, 130 (1992). 
 134. Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1201–12 (1992). 
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others sentencing drug cases almost exclusively.”135 In short, 
“judicial experience” can mean many different things, and it 
would be surprising if the variation in caseload played no role 
in shaping judges’ views and expectations about the legal is-
sues they confront. For example, trial judges who hear a high 
proportion of violent criminal cases may become inured to the 
severity of violent crime, and therefore “establish a higher 
threshold for evaluating serious crime.”136 That may help ex-
plain why judges who sentence a higher proportion of violent 
crimes tend to impose fewer, and shorter, sentences of incarcer-
ation.137  
The content of a judge’s docket also may affect her deci-
sions in a more direct way. As noted in Part I, statutory inter-
pretation is not a mechanical exercise, as most statutes contain 
gaps and ambiguities that leave substantial discretion in the 
hands of those who must interpret them. In the course of im-
plementing such statutes, judges do not simply apply the law 
laid down by Congress. Judges make law. Importantly, howev-
er, judicial lawmaking must occur within the contours of an ac-
tual case. And as others have argued, the nature of the case—
whether the plaintiff is a sympathetic character, say—can have 
real consequences for the content of the law.138  
 
 135. Brian D. Johnson, The Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: In-
tegrating Judge- and County-Level Influences, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 278 (2006). 
 136. Id. at 269; see also Robert M. Emerson, Holistic Effects in Social Con-
trol Decision-Making, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 425, 426 (1983) (“[T]he makeup of 
the overall ‘stream of cases’ . . . provides a background against which the clas-
sification of particular cases in organizationally relevant ways will be made.”). 
Lawrence Baum has offered a similar hypothesis regarding the effect of judi-
cial service on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court: 
If judges hear a succession of similar cases, they may ascribe the 
attributes of past cases to current cases. The work of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court is a possible example. Although the sur-
veillance court constitutes part-time duty for the federal judges who 
sit on it, each of those judges typically hears several dozen requests a 
year for warrants to conduct electronic surveillance. The surveillance 
court almost never denies these requests, largely because of the le-
nient statutory requirements for approval, so judges may develop a 
strong expectation that any given warrant request is justified. 
Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1667, 1678 (2009). 
 137. Johnson, supra note 135, at 288. 
 138. See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 883 (2006) (assessing the efficacy of live disputes in the common law 
system). As Schauer explains,  
[i]f judges have a hard time avoiding what they see as the right result 
for the particular case in all of its contextual richness, and if they are 
at the same time making law for future cases, then the combination of 
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Once one recognizes that a judge’s decision on a given legal 
question may be shaped by the characteristics of the case in 
which the question is presented, it becomes clear that litigants’ 
choices can exert significant influence on the content of the law. 
Judges, after all, do not reach out and choose the cases they 
hear.139 Litigants decide which cases to file, which cases to set-
tle, and which cases to appeal.140 Those decisions determine 
which disputes are decided by judges, and when—which can af-
fect the substance of legal doctrine. For example, commentators 
have argued persuasively that repeat-player litigants can “en-
gineer favorable precedents” through their settlement behav-
ior.141 Consider the case of a car manufacturer sued for a defec-
tive design element. Although the plaintiff ’s personal damages 
may not amount to much, the case may be worth millions to the 
defendant because a ruling that the design is defective will 
have far-reaching consequences, including future suits by other 
injured consumers, low sales, redesign costs, and so on. In that 
scenario, the defendant will be anxious to settle all but the 
strongest cases for its side, because the cost of an adverse rul-
ing is so high.142 The upshot is that the cases presented for 
judicial decision will tend to have especially strong facts for the 
repeat-player manufacturer and weak facts for the plaintiff 
 
the salience of the particular case and the pull to decide it correctly 
may produce a rule that is unrepresentative of the full range of future 
cases that can be expected to be decided under it. 
Id. at 900. 
 139. That is so even for courts—like the U.S. Supreme Court—with discre-
tionary dockets. Although the Supreme Court generally cannot be forced to 
hear a case that the Justices do not wish to decide, the Justices have no power 
to create opportunities for decisionmaking but must wait for cases to be 
brought to their attention. See, e.g., Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 502 (1985).  
 140. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 17 (1981) (“Litigants, not judges, set court agendas.”). 
 141. Cross, supra note 66, at 7–8 (laying out the economic case for this 
strategy); see also Lederman, supra note 6, at 234 (“[P]arties’ settlement behav-
ior will influence the substantive content of precedent.”); cf. Hylton, supra note 
64, at 427 (“One can think of procedural rules as gates that determine the flow 
of claims into courts, which are constantly reshaping legal doctrine; open the 
gate a little wider, and the emerging doctrine takes a different shape.”).  
 142. To illustrate, imagine that while the plaintiff in the example above 
stands to recover $10,000 if she wins, the defendant believes that the full costs 
of a judgment in the plaintiff ’s favor would be $100,000. It should be clear that 
the parties will tend to settle in this scenario, because the defendant will be 
willing to offer more than the plaintiff will demand. For an argument that 
asymmetric stakes reduce settlement more generally, see George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
24–29 (1984). 
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consumers, which in turn will tend to generate a set of prece-
dents that favor manufacturers.143  
Thus, judges’ decisions may be affected by the cases they 
hear in at least two ways. First, judges’ caseloads help define 
their experiences as judges, which—like other types of life ex-
perience—influence their views of the world. Judges’ views of 
the world, in turn, play a role in shaping their legal decisions. 
Second, judges make legal decisions in the context of particular 
cases, and the content of their decisions may vary in important 
ways based on the nature of the cases presented to them.  
B. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO INCREASED LITIGATION RATES 
Litigation incentives are designed—and for present pur-
poses I assume that they work—to change the range of cases 
that judges hear, and in particular to increase the number of 
claims filed under particular statutes. I have argued that such 
incentives are likely to have some effect on judges’ decisions. 
The remaining question is how heightened litigation rates are 
likely to affect judicial behavior. That question has received 
virtually no attention to date. To the extent that scholars have 
considered the link between litigation incentives and legal doc-
trine, they have assumed that if more suits are filed by a cer-
tain constituency, the law probably will develop in favor of that 
constituency—or at least will not move in the other direction. 
For example, Joseph Smith has the following to say about the 
Clean Air Act: 
By expanding the opportunity for suits seeking stricter enforcement, 
but not for suits seeking less enforcement, Congress increased the op-
portunities of the courts to move policy toward Congress’s prefer-
ences, but did not increase opportunities to move policy away from its 
wishes. The institutional passivity of courts means that they need ap-
propriate cases as vehicles for policymaking. It is relatively difficult 
for a court to use a case seeking stricter environmental regulation to 
move policy toward less strict regulation. Because Congress can fine-
tune the direction of the influence courts exert over policy, it can safe-
 
 143. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Pri-
vate Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1043 (1986) (arguing that the rel-
atively high settlement rate in antitrust, coupled with a low plaintiff win rate 
in cases that do not settle, “suggests antitrust defendants employ a careful 
and conservative approach in deciding which cases should be allowed to go to 
judgment”). For an argument linking the evolution of precedent to the respec-
tive resources of the parties, see generally Richard Startz & Albert Yoon, Liti-
gant Resources and the Evolution of Legal Precedent (Sept. 8, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475350. 
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ly expand judicial influence even when the courts are dominated by 
the other party.144 
Smith does not explain why it is “relatively difficult” for 
courts to use cases seeking to strengthen statutory protections 
to cut back on those protections, and the basis for that assump-
tion is unclear. Every case has two sides, and a plaintiff ’s ef-
forts to move the law in a favorable direction can backfire, re-
sulting in a legal rule that is worse (from the plaintiff ’s 
perspective) than the status quo. That is why legal advocacy 
groups choose their cases carefully and avoid advancing 
envelope-pushing arguments in weak vehicles.145  
In short, unless one believes that judges decide cases by 
flipping coins, there is little reason to assume that more cases 
seeking a particular form of relief will result in more decisions 
granting such relief. That happy result certainly is possible, but 
it is not inevitable. In this section, I consider two very different 
ways judges might respond to increases in the rate of litigation 
under particular statutes. On the one hand, exposure to more 
cases of a certain type could improve judges’ understanding of, 
and support for, the underlying claims. On the other hand, 
statutory mechanisms designed to strengthen private enforce-
ment of federal statutes could trigger a judicial backlash 
against the very rights that Congress sought to advance. I ar-
gue that the latter response is more likely. At the very least, it 
is a risk that legislators should consider, particularly “when the 
courts are dominated by the opposite party.”146 
1. Judicial Learning? 
One might imagine that judges, even those who are other-
wise inclined to view a certain class of claims with boredom or 
hostility, would become more sympathetic to such claims after 
seeing case after case presenting similar facts.147 Experience 
 
 144. Smith, supra note 50, at 148. Sean Farhang, whose excellent study of 
litigation incentives is discussed in Part I, argues along similar lines that 
Congress might rationally respond to the judicial decisions that reduce statu-
tory protections, thereby making litigation less attractive to potential plain-
tiffs, by either increasing the possible judgment or decreasing the cost of those 
suits. FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 61–68.  
 145. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 146. Smith, supra note 50, at 148. 
 147. One example of an apparently sympathetic judicial response can be 
found in the context of immigration. Due to a variety of legal changes (but not 
to litigation incentives), appeals from removal decisions by the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals to the circuit courts skyrocketed in the early 2000s. See Sy-
denham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration 
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with multiple cases might counteract whatever biases (con-
scious or unconscious) judges begin with. For example, there 
are troubling suggestions in both case law and commentary 
that some judges do not take sexual harassment claims serious-
ly.148 That sentiment is captured by “[o]ne judge [who] was al-
leged to have said in open court that a . . . sexual harassment 
claim was not serious because [the plaintiff ’s] employer only 
stared at her breasts, rather than touching them, and ‘most 
women like that.’”149 Such stereotyped thinking typically is 
grounded in ignorance, and in theory could be combated by 
mechanisms like diversity training,150 as well as by more in-
formal experience and learning. After seeing multiple cases 
demonstrating that many women do not enjoy being ogled by 
their employers, a judge might gain a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the dynamics of workplace harassment. 
The nature of the litigation process does not lend itself to 
this type of judicial learning, however. In a fascinating study of 
judicial decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and 
Andrew Wistrich show that judges frequently rely on intuitive, 
 
Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10 (2006) (“During a four-year period [from 
2002 through 2005], immigration appeals septupled from 1,760 to 12,349 per 
year. . . . The increase in appeals is so large that it qualifies as one of the most 
important changes in all of federal appellate practice.”). Appellate judges have 
not taken well to the startling rise in appeals, but they have directed their 
hostility to the government processes that generate the appeals rather than to 
the claims themselves. E.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 829, 829 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“In the year ending on the date of the argument, different panels of 
this court reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in whole or part in a 
staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that were re-
solved on the merits. The corresponding figure, for the 82 civil cases during 
this period in which the United States was the appellee, was 18 percent. Our 
criticisms of the Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been 
severe.”); see also Alexander, supra, at 15 (“One benefit of the surge in appeals 
is that many circuit judges have seen so many immigration cases that they are 
able to identify patterns of error.”); Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ 
Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 
WLNR 20942331. 
 148. John H. Doyle et al., Report of the Working Committees to the Second 
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117, 352 (noting that trial judges in the Second Circuit 
sometimes “exhibited impatience with [sexual harassment] claims, as well as 
stereotyped thinking about the seriousness of the sexual harassment”).  
 149. Id. at 348. 
 150. See generally Louise F. Pendry et al., Diversity Training: Putting 
Theory into Practice, 80 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCH. 27 (2007) 
(discussing the nature and efficacy of diversity training in the workforce). 
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rather than deliberative, thinking.151 Intuition can be used con-
structively, but it is also “the likely pathway by which undesir-
able influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of par-
ties, affect the legal system.”152 The authors emphasize that 
“the capacity to use intuitive thinking successfully may require 
years of ‘effortful study’ as well as accurate and reliable feed-
back on earlier judgments.”153 Unfortunately, judges’ intuitions 
typically develop in what Guthrie and his coauthors call 
“wicked” environments that are not conducive to learning. 
Judges often handle only part of a case, so they “do not learn 
how things went at a later stage, [and] they cannot gauge the 
long-term effectiveness of their decisions.”154 Similarly, most 
trial judges rely on magistrate judges to handle settlement ne-
gotiations, and so do not see the full range of disputes that gen-
erate complaints. The cases that go to trial (or summary judg-
ment) do not represent a random sample of justiciable disputes. 
Any cases that contain particularly strong facts for either side 
are likely to be settled, meaning that the cases that trial judges 
actually do see will tend to be close.155 When reasonable minds 
can disagree on what inferences to draw from a set of facts, 
judges are likely to fall back on their preexisting assumptions 
about the world rather than reconsidering those assumptions 
in light of new information. Making matters worse, judges rare-
ly get the feedback they would need in order to learn from their 
mistakes. Guthrie and his coauthors explain that: 
[J]udges are unlikely to obtain accurate and reliable feedback on most 
of the judgments they make; indeed, they are only likely to receive ex-
ternal validation (or invalidation) of the accuracy of their judgments 
 
 151. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); see also POSNER, supra note 120, at 107 (“In-
tuition plays a major role in judicial as in most decision making. The faculty of 
intuition that enables a judge, a businessman, or an army commander to make 
a quick judgment without a conscious weighting and comparison of the pros 
and cons of the possible courses of action is best understood as a capability for 
reaching down into a subconscious repository of knowledge acquired from one’s 
education and particularly one’s experiences . . . .”). 
 152. Guthrie et al., supra note 151, at 31. 
 153. Id. at 31–32. 
 154. Id. at 34. The authors note that “errors seldom have adverse conse-
quences for judges,” and “indirect consequences may be insufficient to guaran-
tee good or improved performance.” Id. Moreover, while “most judges want 
their colleagues to respect them, one judge seldom learns the details of anoth-
er judge’s potentially erroneous decision making.” Id. at 35. 
 155. See Priest & Klein, supra note 142, at 14–15 (explaining why close 
cases are more likely to be litigated than cases that are skewed in favor of one 
or the other party). 
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when their rulings are challenged on appeal. The appeals process, 
however, does not provide reliable feedback. Many cases settle before 
appellate courts resolve the appeal; collateral policy concerns influ-
ence the outcome of some appeals, clouding the meaning of appellate 
decisions for the trial judge; and finally, appeals commonly take years 
to resolve, heavily diluting the value of any feedback. Moreover, the 
standards of review require appellate courts to give deference to trial 
judges on many of their discretionary decisions.156 
The prospects for judicial learning are even more dim on 
the appellate courts. For any category of cases, appellate judges 
see only a tiny fraction of disputes. They are not confronted 
with flesh-and-blood plaintiffs and defendants, but instead get 
the facts from the paper record—including from the trial 
judge’s own decision. Appellate judges are unlikely to be aware 
of the rate of settlement, and so may erroneously equate a low 
plaintiff win rate at trial (or typically weak plaintiff facts at 
trial) with low plaintiff success rates overall.157 Given the rarity 
of en banc review158 or review by the Supreme Court,159 togeth-
er with the strong tradition of horizontal precedent on the 
courts of appeals,160 appellate judges seldom get useful feed-
back on their decisions. Although judges’ opinions may be criti-
cized by academics or journalists, objective criteria for evaluat-
ing judicial performance are hard to come by, making it all too 
easy for judges to “dismiss[] academic criticism of their work as 
being the product of politics (plus envy and ignorance of judicial 
 
 156. Guthrie et al., supra note 151, at 32. 
 157. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 138 n.106 (citing In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–300 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that the Rhone-Poulenc court used defendant-drug companies’ 92.3 percent 
win rate in prior cases brought by other hemophiliacs to justify denial of class 
action status to the hemophiliac plaintiffs, and describing this as a “disturbing 
example” of the tendency to focus on trial outcomes and ignore settlements). 
 158. Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for 
Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 818 
(1993) (reporting that, between 1982 and 1991, each circuit decided an average 
of 7.5 cases on en banc review per year). 
 159. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1483 (2003) (“While the circuit courts decide tens of 
thousands of cases per year, the Supreme Court recently has reviewed fewer 
than one hundred of those decisions, or less than 3% of the petitions filed, per 
year. Hence, . . . ‘the decision of the court of appeals was left undisturbed in 
99.7[%] of [those courts’] cases.’” (quoting DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CON-
TINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 17 (2000))). 
 160. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1011, 1017 (2003) (“Litigants feel precedent’s preclusive effect most keen-
ly in the courts of appeals, which candidly describe their approach to stare de-
cisis as ‘strict,’ ‘binding,’ and ‘rigid.’”). 
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working conditions) and to dismiss journalistic criticism as 
likewise the product of politics and ignorance.”161 
While most features of the appellate decisionmaking 
process seem poorly suited to learning, the fact that appellate 
judges decide cases in panels of three might cut in the other di-
rection.162 Studies have found compelling evidence that the 
composition of an appellate panel can affect case outcomes. For 
example, a panel made up of two judges appointed by Demo-
cratic presidents and one judge appointed by a Republican 
president will behave differently from one that is all Democrat-
ic, or all Republican.163 Similarly, an all-male panel in a sex 
discrimination case is likely to reach a different decision than a 
panel that consists of two men and one woman.164 One explana-
tion for such “panel effects”165 is that the Republican or female 
judge injects unique insights into the panel’s delibera-
tions, thereby opening her colleagues’ eyes to arguments or 
points of view they might otherwise have missed.166 The possi-
bility that judges learn from their co-panelists in that way may 
have important implications for litigation incentives, as it sug-
gests that judges who hear a high volume of cases of the same 
type may change their views over time. Each judge will encoun-
ter the same claims over and over, but in the company of differ-
ent colleagues who may broaden his perspective and deepen his 
understanding of the issues involved.  
While such learning is theoretically possible, the tempo-
rary nature of panel effects suggests that they are better ex-
plained by a desire to avoid dissent. Dissent is quite rare in the 
courts of appeals, occurring in only six to eight percent of all 
cases, including those in “particularly contentious issue areas, 
where measures of individual judges’ voting and measures of 
 
 161. POSNER, supra note 120, at 39. 
 162. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investiga-
tion into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2008) (“[T]here is an argument that the collegial 
nature of multimember appellate panels contributes to reflective decisionmak-
ing and thus to the quality of appellate review.”). 
 163. See POSNER, supra note 120, at 31 & n.26 (citing studies). 
 164. See Boyd et al., supra note 121; Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, In-
stitutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation 
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 320 (2004).  
 165. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Pol-
icy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 851–52 
(2006) (describing panel effects). 
 166. See POSNER, supra note 120, at 31; see also Farhang & Wawro, supra 
note 164, at 308. 
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panel outcomes show wide ideological variation.”167 Judges do 
not like to dissent because it takes up valuable time with no le-
gal effect. And judges do not like it when their colleagues dis-
sent, because “[j]udges do not like to be criticized, to bother 
having to revise a draft opinion in order to parry any solid 
punches thrown by the dissent, or, worst of all, to lose the third 
judge to the dissenter.”168 The result is a strong norm of una-
nimity, which encourages judges serving on a panel together to 
reach a decision acceptable to all. Thus, male judges may vote 
for the plaintiff in a sexual discrimination case, not because 
they have been persuaded that such discrimination is a serious 
problem, but because their female colleague feels strongly 
about the issue and will dissent from a pro-defendant ruling.169  
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of compromise and 
learning, but existing research strongly suggests that the for-
mer is driving observed panel effects. Studies show that judges 
behave differently depending on the identity of their current co-
panelists, not that they continue to behave differently after 
serving on a heterogeneous panel. If judges truly were learning 
from one another—rather than moderating their votes (and 
perhaps the content of their opinions) in order to achieve una-
nimity—one would expect to see lasting changes in their votes. 
An all-male panel in a sex discrimination case might vote one 
way in an early case, but if the same panel were reconvened af-
ter each judge had encountered similar cases while sitting with 
a female colleague, the result should be different. The research 
on panel effects contains no evidence of that phenomenon. On 
the contrary, by demonstrating that judges’ decisionmaking 
changes from one panel to the next, the panel-effects literature 
indicates that any learning that occurs on a panel evaporates 
with the next assignment.  
 
 167. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 164, at 306. 
 168. POSNER, supra note 120, at 32. 
 169. See id.; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 164, at 308 (“In the consensus 
through bargaining scenario, the minority judge does not change the minds of 
majority group members of the panel, but rather trades her vote for a change 
in the content of the opinion relative to that ideally preferred by the majority 
group judges.”). The judge in the minority on the panel likewise will adjust her 
vote to meet her other two colleagues somewhere between their respective 
ideals. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 165, at 863 (“Usually judges show a 
‘collegial concurrence,’ in accordance with which Republican appointees dis-
play relatively liberal voting patterns when sitting with two Democratic ap-
pointees, and Democratic appointees display fairly conservative voting pat-
terns when sitting with two Republican appointees.”). 
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Finally, it is not clear that simply seeing case after case of 
the same type will give judges the information they need in or-
der to understand the legal claims involved. For example, 
scholars have argued persuasively that Title VII doctrine, with 
its focus on conscious discrimination, simply asks the wrong 
question, as many forms of bias operate wholly subconscious-
ly.170 Thus, the judge who sees countless Title VII cases where 
the defendant seems like a nice enough fellow, and certainly 
not a bigot, may erroneously conclude that most claims of dis-
crimination are overblown. Increased litigation rates will not 
lead to judicial learning if a sophisticated grasp of cognitive 
psychology is required in order to comprehend the nature of 
employment discrimination. The same is true for other areas of 
the law. For example, securities-law scholars argue that few 
judges have an accurate sense of investor and organizational 
behavior. As Stephen Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati have ex-
plained, “[t]hat is not an expertise that can be gained by seeing 
a lot of cases. That is expertise that can only be gained by look-
ing at the academic research on these topics (assuming that the 
judge is not out doing empirical research on his or her own).”171 
In sum, while it is possible that more cases of a particular 
kind will lead to judicial learning and to more pro-plaintiff out-
comes, the nature of the litigation process suggests that in-
creased litigation rates are unlikely to have a positive effect on 
judges—particularly those who are not inclined to favor the 
claims involved. The more likely result is judicial backlash 
against litigation incentives and the substantive rights they 
were designed to promote.  
2. Judicial Backlash 
Federal judges have long complained about overcrowded 
dockets and inadequate resources,172 and judicial decisions fre-
 
 170. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: 
A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1991) (asserting that many employment deci-
sions often result from unintentional judgment errors, rather than motiva-
tional bias). 
 171. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? 
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securi-
ties Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 86 n.6 (2002). 
 172. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to 
Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3, 6–11 (recounting judges’ responses to a survey 
by the Federal Courts Study Commission regarding caseload pressures); Lau-
ren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 896–97 
(1993) (discussing the “caseload crisis” of the federal courts and the judicial 
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quently invoke the specter of a “flood of litigation.”173 Such con-
cerns are particularly common in the context of employment 
discrimination and civil rights litigation—two areas where 
Congress has used litigation incentives to encourage more cas-
es. In 1993, just as the federal courts were beginning to feel the 
effects of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a former federal 
judge published an editorial in the New York Times contending 
that employment discrimination cases take up too much judi-
cial time because they are “rarely settled, are characterized by 
high levels of acrimony and subjective claims of victimization; 
they are immensely time consuming and are controlled by legal 
standards that, lacking sufficient precision, are overgeneralized 
and of marginal use.”174 Another judge wrote an article arguing 
that Congress should create special Article I courts to deal with 
claims that are overloading the federal courts, including Title 
VII claims in that category.175 The same judge repeated that 
recommendation several years later in a decision in a Title VII 
case, explaining:  
This case shows once again the need to adjust our anti-discrimination 
laws. The evidence needed to make a prima facie case is much too 
low. It seems that almost anyone not selected for a job can maintain a 
court action. It is for this reason that the federal courts are flooded 
with employment cases. . . . It is obvious that amendatory legislation 
is required. What is needed is a better screening mechanism as a pre-
requisite for gaining access to this nation’s federal court system. If an 
appropriate screening mechanism cannot be devised, then at a mini-
mum a new Article I court should be created to hear this flood of cas-
es. The point is some change is urgently needed.176 
These are not the isolated comments of a few disgruntled 
judges. One of the recommendations of the Long Range Plan for 
the Federal Courts, commissioned in the early 1990s, was that 
cases involving “economic or personnel relations or personal 
liability arising in the workforce” be diverted to state courts or 
 
reaction to it, including efforts by judges to shift their caseloads—for example, 
by encouraging settlement—in order to make time for the cases they feel are 
most professionally rewarding); see also Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 171, 
at 102 (“That federal judges, at both the trial and circuit court levels, are un-
der severe resource and expertise constraints is well-documented.”). 
 173. See Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Flood-
gates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 383 (2003) (tracing judicial use 
of the “flood of litigation” metaphor to the 1800s). 
 174. Kenneth Conboy, Op-Ed., Trouble in Foley Square, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
27, 1993, at A17, available at 1993 WLNR 3360187. 
 175. Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L. REV. 
751, 757–59 (1992). 
 176. Tschappat v. Reich, 957 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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handled by administrative agencies.177 The Second Circuit Task 
Force on Gender, Ethnic, and Racial Fairness in the Courts 
found that “[m]any federal judges . . . appear to believe that the 
proliferation of small [employment discrimination] cases involv-
ing individual claimants clog up the federal courts and divert 
judges’ attention from larger, purportedly more significant, civil 
cases.”178 The D.C. Circuit’s Task Force on Gender, Race, and 
Ethnic Bias reported that sixteen to seventeen percent of court 
employees observed “a judge treat an employment discrimina-
tion case as unimportant or a waste of time—a higher percen-
tage than for any other case category apart from prisoner peti-
tions.”179 The same report stated that three judges in the circuit 
spoke “unfavorably about employment discrimination cases,” 
and another judge told researchers that some judges had an 
“attitude” about Title VII plaintiffs, whom they viewed as “dis-
gruntled employee[s].”180 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit’s Gender 
Fairness Task Force found that 10.9 percent of judges agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement that discrimination cases 
are undeserving of federal court time because “the issues are 
trivial.”181  
It bears emphasis that judicial perceptions about litigation 
rates may be influenced by litigation incentives themselves. For 
example, as explained in Part II, Congress’s enactment of 
CRAFAA in 1976 appears not to have had any clear effect on 
the number of civil rights actions filed under statutes like 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Yet Justice Powell, dissenting in a case involving 
the award of fees under CRAFAA, argued that “harassing liti-
gation and its potential for intimidation increases in suits 
where the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees. 
. . . [CRAFAA] has become a major additional source of litiga-
tion. Since its enactment in 1976, suits against state officials 
under § 1983 have increased geometrically.”182 Another Su-
 
 177. Doyle et al., supra note 148, at 343. 
 178. Id. 
 179. SPECIAL COMM. ON GEND., DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON GENDER TO THE D.C. CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACE 
AND ETHNIC BIAS 101 (1995). 
 180. Id. at 102. 
 181. EIGHTH CIRCUIT GEND. FAIRNESS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1997), reprinted in 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9, 72–73 (1997). 
 182. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 555–56 (1984). Another judge voiced 
the same complaint more colorfully: 
  Fee applications under [CRAFAA] and kindred statutes have be-
come a burgeoning form of satellite litigation in the federal 
courts . . . . [T]he counsel fee tail cannot be permitted to wag the 
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preme Court Justice told researchers that the Court is 
“‘swamped’” by civil rights cases fueled by fee shifts, and that 
there is a “‘ceiling on how much time [the Court] can give to 
these issues.’”183 
Thus, even if litigation incentives do not in fact increase 
the number of claims filed, judges may believe that they do.184 
Part of the problem is that litigation incentives often generate 
significant satellite litigation over procedural issues such as the 
appropriate amount of attorney’s fees or enhanced damages, or 
what it takes for a plaintiff to “prevail” and therefore qualify 
for a one-way fee shift.185 Moreover, a belief that litigation in-
centives are generating more and more lawsuits often goes 
hand-in-hand with an assumption that many of those lawsuits 
are frivolous.186 Scholars and judges have voiced concerns about 
frivolous litigation in many contexts where litigation incentives 
are available, ranging from qui tam actions under the False 
Claims Act,187 to civil RICO,188 to antitrust,189 to the Americans 
With Disabilities Act,190 and beyond.  
 
client’s dog. There are storm clouds on the horizon which suggest that 
there may be a developing inclination on the part of the organized bar 
to view such statutes as a road-map to a perceived pot of gold at the 
end of the courtroom rainbow. Any such auxetic tendency to nourish 
litigation for the cardinal sake of fee generation must be stopped in 
its tracks. Should the scales tip in this direction, counsel fees will be-
come the raison d’etre for suits; the good intentions of the Congress 
will be distorted beyond recognition; and, if the Court may be permit-
ted to mix zoological metaphors, the bar’s cart will figuratively be 
placed before the public’s horse. 
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 564 F. Supp. 581, 592–93 (D.R.I. 1983). 
 183. Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Bridging the Gap Between Congress and 
the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and the Erosion of the American Rule Gov-
erning Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, 38 W. POL. Q. 238, 246 (1985) (quoting an un-
identified Supreme Court Justice interviewed in the 1983–1984 academic year). 
 184. Another source of judicial misperception of litigation rates is the me-
dia, which notoriously over-reports plaintiff victories (especially big ones), fu-
eling the sense that certain kinds of cases are both easy to bring and easy to 
win. See, e.g., Nielsen & Beim, supra note 26, at 243 (“In the aggregate, the 
media represents plaintiff victories in tort cases far more frequently than they 
actually occur and jury awards as far greater than they actually are.”). 
 185. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 556 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Regretta-
bly, disputes over the reasonableness of . . . fee awards often become the major 
issue in the entire litigation.”). 
 186. But cf. supra note 64 (explaining that one-way fee shifts should en-
courage the filing of relatively strong claims). 
 187. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Moni-
toring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1855 
(1996) (“[T]he qui tam mechanism provides inadequate disincentives for rela-
tors to file meritless suits.”); Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care 
Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1383 
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Judges have ample tools with which to combat what they 
view as frivolous or simply excessive litigation, some procedural 
and others substantive. Scholars have recognized as much at 
the level of the individual case, detailing how “managerial 
judges” may pressure parties to settle cases, or make aggres-
sive use of mechanisms like early dismissal and summary 
judgment.191 More broadly, Bert Huang’s recent study of appel-
late decisionmaking shows that judges may respond to in-
creased rates of appeal by reversing fewer cases across the 
board.192  
Judges’ capacity to cut back on litigation extends well 
beyond such reactive measures, however. Judges also can use 
doctrine proactively to reduce the number, or change the com-
plexion, of the cases that will fill up their dockets going for-
 
(2002) (suggesting that “meritless lawsuits” may be to blame for the increase 
in qui tam litigation). 
 188. See, e.g., Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (“RICO’s lure of treble damages and attorneys’ fees draws liti-
gants and lawyers . . . like lemmings to the sea.”); Am. Bar Ass’n, RICO Coor-
dinating Committee Report, 112 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 277, 280 (1987) (arguing 
that curtailing civil RICO suits “would save the federal courts from a virtual 
flood of unwarranted litigation”); Elwyn Berton Spence, The Improper Civil 
RICO Claim: If Such a Thing Exists, Can It Be Battled with Sanctions?, 51 
ALA. LAW. 290, 292 (1990) (“As a result of its attractive civil remedies and a 
statement of purpose commanding courts to construe it liberally, RICO has 
been the basis of suits filed against almost anyone, with only the . . . creativity 
and imagination of plaintiff ’s lawyers serving as a limit. . . . [A]t some ex-
tremely indeterminate point, creativity and imagination become frivolity.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 815 (1987) (arguing that the 
availability of treble damages for antitrust violations “encourages filing of 
claims which are at best marginal and at worst frivolous”).  
 190. See, e.g., Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical 
Study of the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 43 n.184 
(2001) (“Since the ADA’s enactment, its critics have argued that the right to 
file employment discrimination complaints under the ADA has inspired a bar-
rage of frivolous charges brought by people with ‘bad backs,’ ‘psychological 
stress,’ and other ‘nonserious’ disabilities . . . .”); James Bovard, The Disabili-
ties Act’s Parade of Absurdities, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A16 (suggest-
ing that the ADA produces absurd lawsuits).  
 191. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doc-
trine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 706 (2007) (“One obvious way to expedite dock-
ets . . . is to find ways to encourage settlement. The public and bar often praise 
judges for bringing about settlements and rarely vilify them. The bench has 
several powerful tools in its arsenal to settle cases.”). See generally Judith 
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).  
 192. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny 20–21 (Sept. 30, 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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ward. On the side of procedure, judges can cut back on litiga-
tion incentives themselves, by interpreting the relevant statu-
tory provisions narrowly. For example, citing the need to en-
courage settlement, the Supreme Court interpreted the term 
“prevailing party”—which appears in many fee-shifting provi-
sions—to apply only to those plaintiffs who obtain a “material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” such as a fa-
vorable judgment on the merits or a consent decree.193 The con-
sequence is that a plaintiff whose suit induces the defendant to 
change its conduct voluntarily cannot collect fees. Courts like-
wise have limited the amount of fees recoverable by prevailing 
plaintiffs’ attorneys,194 have held that defendants may make a 
waiver of fees a condition of settlement,195 and have refused to 
permit pro se litigants to collect fees.196 As for damages, courts 
have limited the availability of both statutory and punitive 
damages in cases where plaintiffs cannot prove actual damag-
es.197 Such decisions reduce the value, and hence the likely ef-
fect, of litigation incentives. 
 
 193. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603–04 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n 
v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 498 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)); cf. Andrea Saltzman, 
Incorporating Statutes into the Common Law: The Judicial Response to Stat-
utes Shifting Attorneys’ Fees, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1103, 1142 (1986) (describ-
ing state court hostility to fee-shifting statutes). For critical commentary, see 
generally Albiston & Nielson, supra note 22, and David Shub, Private Attor-
neys General, Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit: Attorney’s Fees Awards 
for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706 (1992).  
 194. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How 
Fee-Shifting Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to 
Justice (Though Some Judges Don’t Get It) 4 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 150, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407275 (“Driven by the view that ‘civil 
rights litigation “is not part and parcel of ordinary practice, but is more in the 
nature of charity or volunteer work,”’ judges insist that fee-shifting statutes 
‘were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of 
attorneys.’ They accordingly have elaborated doctrinal rules that presume that 
civil rights lawyers ought not care whether or how much they get paid, and 
they often vigorously police fee requests for signs that plaintiffs’ counsel is get-
ting greedy.” (quoting Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil 
Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 
373 (1990))). 
 195. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 737–38 (1986). 
 196. See generally Susan L. Keilitz, Note, Attorney Fees, Freedom of Infor-
mation, and Pro Se Litigants: Per Se Prohibitions Frustrate Policies, 26 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 349 (1985) (criticizing courts’ refusal to permit awards under the 
Freedom of Information Act of attorneys’ fees to pro se litigants). 
 197. See Hong, supra note 54, at 72–73 (criticizing a Supreme Court deci-
sion narrowly interpreting the Privacy Act’s award of statutory damages); Jus-
tin W. Ristau, Should Punitive Damages Be Recoverable Absent A Finding of 
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Similarly, by restricting standing to sue under particular 
statutes, judges can decrease the number of plaintiffs who can 
access incentives such as enhanced damages. The Supreme 
Court has done just that in the antitrust context, holding that 
only direct purchasers have antitrust standing to bring treble 
damages actions under the Clayton Act.198 The Court empha-
sized that suits by indirect purchasers could subject the defen-
dant to double liability—to both direct and indirect purchasers 
of the good in question.199 But, as others have noted, the provi-
sion for treble damages no doubt played an important role in 
the decision: “[T]he reality that any double recovery would be 
six fold recovery was . . . a key reason why the majority was 
willing to adopt a much narrower standing rule than applies in 
modern tort law.”200  
Judges also can craft procedural rules of more general ap-
plication. For example, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the Su-
preme Court adopted a new and more restrictive rule governing 
pleading, explicitly linking its decision to concerns about merit-
less strike suits designed to extract settlements from defend-
 
Actual Damages Under the Federal Fair Housing Act?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 343, 
362–64 (2001) (criticizing a decision narrowly interpreting the Fair Housing 
Act’s provision for punitive damages); see also Timothy J. Moran, Punitive 
Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise Restrictions on a Neces-
sary Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 282 (2001) (arguing that “[l]ower 
courts continue to hinder the effectiveness of punitive damages in fair housing 
cases” by refusing to let the issue of punitive damages go to the jury, and hold-
ing that punitive damages are not available if the jury does not award com-
pensatory damages). Although typically focused on state rather than federal 
statutory cases, the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting the amount of punitive 
damages on constitutional grounds likewise “serve anti-litigation ends.” An-
drew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Or-
ganizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 
1147 (2006). 
 198. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); see also Associated 
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 526–29 (1983) (holding that labor unions may not sue for nonbusiness in-
direct harms of alleged antitrust violations); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that the plaintiff in a private 
antitrust case for damages must show not only anticompetitive conduct but 
also that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was of the kind that the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent); cf. Blue Shield of Va., Inc. v. McCready, 457 
U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (“Congress did not intend to allow every person tangen-
tially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover three-
fold damages for the injury to his business or property.”). 
 199. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730–31. 
 200. Baker, supra note 3, at 384–85 (emphasis omitted); see also Breit & 
Elzinga, supra note 53, at 420 (noting the Court’s “obvious concern with ruin-
ous awards”). 
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ants anxious to avoid the crushing cost of antitrust discovery 
and the risk of treble damages.201 The Court recently reaf-
firmed—and arguably extended—Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
where it threw out a Bivens constitutional tort claim against 
high-ranking government officials on the ground that the com-
plaint lacked sufficient factual allegations of discriminatory in-
tent.202 As Iqbal makes clear, Twombly’s new rule applies to all 
categories of federal civil litigation, making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to get through the courthouse door.203 
Most important for present purposes, judges may respond 
to increased litigation rates (imagined or not) with narrow in-
terpretations of the substantive provisions of the relevant stat-
ute.204 The suggestion, quoted above, that antidiscrimination 
laws should be adjusted to make it harder for a plaintiff to 
make a prima facie case, illustrates this possibility.205 And re-
ports of judicial hostility to, and backlash against, employment 
discrimination statutes are legion in the academic literature.206 
The result is a body of case law that makes employment dis-
crimination cases extremely difficult to win. 
 
 201. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–60 (2007). 
 202. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948–49 (2009). 
 203. Id. at 1953. 
 204. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social 
Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 800 (1967) (noting that judges may react to case-
load pressures with the “adoption of ‘hostile’ substantive rules” effectively dis-
couraging “litigants from using the courts”). 
 205. Supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 206. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between 
What Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 791, 809 (2002) (discussing judicial hostility to sexual harassment 
claims and the various tactics courts use to dispose of such cases); Theresa M. 
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 72–73 (1999) (arguing that courts have become in-
creasingly hostile to harassment cases brought under Title VII, and attribut-
ing such hostility to the huge increase in Title VII claims after 1991); Michael 
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 556, 569 (2001) (arguing that judges wrongly perceive employment 
discrimination cases as too easy to bring and typically unmeritorious, and that 
as a result of judicial hostility it will become even harder for plaintiffs to re-
cover, particularly in sexual harassment cases); Anand Swaminathan, The 
Rubric of Force: Employment Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases 
and Judicial Hostility, 3 MODERN AM. 21, 26 (2007) (discussing judicial hostil-
ity toward employment discrimination cases during the 1990s, when litigation 
rates were at their peak); Nielsen et al., supra note 70, at 9 (“Employment civil 
rights are the most common type of case on the federal civil docket which may 
be part of the reason that federal courts have become increasingly hostile to 
these claims, and why judges forcefully urge the parties to settle.”). 
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Employment discrimination plaintiffs win about thirty per-
cent of the cases that go to trial,207 compared to a win rate be-
tween fifty to sixty percent for plaintiffs in tort and contract 
cases.208 They tend to do even worse in cases that are decided 
prior to trial on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
winning less than ten percent of those cases,209 while tort and 
contract plaintiffs win slightly more than thirty percent.210 
Employment discrimination plaintiffs also fare terribly on ap-
peal211—a phenomenon that scholars have attributed to an er-
roneous belief among appellate judges that trial judges are too 
plaintiff friendly.212 Moreover, while litigation rates shot up af-
ter Congress made noneconomic and punitive damages availa-
ble to Title VII plaintiffs in 1991, the plaintiff win rate went 
down.213  
Granted, the settlement rate in employment discrimination 
cases increased somewhat after 1991.214 If settlements are 
 
 207. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 129 (reporting a 28.47 per-
cent win rate for employment discrimination plaintiffs at trial); Nielsen et al., 
supra note 70, at 19 (reporting that plaintiffs win thirty-three percent of all 
employment discrimination cases that result in judgment after trial). 
 208. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 
457 (2004). 
 209. Id.; see also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 128 (“Over the pe-
riod of 1979–2006 in federal court, employment discrimination plaintiffs have 
won 3.59% of the pretrial adjudications, while other plaintiffs have won 21.05% 
of pretrial adjudications.”); Nielsen et al., supra note 70, at 19 (“Of the cases 
that do not settle early, plaintiffs lose the motion for summary judgment in 
more than one-half of these cases (57% of remaining cases or 19% of filings 
overall).”).  
 210. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 208. Clermont and Schwab report a 
total win rate for employment discrimination plaintiffs (including both pretrial 
and trial adjudication) of 16.71 percent, compared to 52.9 percent for non-jobs 
cases. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 128 & display 14. 
 211. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 111 (explaining that in appeals 
of federal employment discrimination cases, a “statistically significant differ-
ential exists for appeals from wins at the stage of pretrial adjudication (thirty 
percent compared to eleven percent), and it becomes more pronounced for ap-
peals from wins at the trial stage (forty-one percent compared to nine per-
cent)”). The plaintiff-defendant spread is more extreme in employment appeals 
than for other civil cases, which have a thirty-five percent reversal rate for de-
fendants and a fifteen percent reversal rate for plaintiffs. See id. 
 212. Id. at 113; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in 
the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instru-
ments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 949. 
 213. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 208, at 433, 457. 
 214. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 20–21; see also Clermont & 
Schwab, supra note 208 (reporting that 67.2 percent of jobs cases settled pre-
1992, while 70.31 percent settled post-1991). The authors were not focused on 
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counted as “wins” for plaintiffs, then the overall success rate 
stayed roughly the same notwithstanding the drop in pro-
plaintiff judgments. But there are several reasons to hesitate 
before deeming the 1991 amendment a success in this respect. 
One is that, while plaintiffs usually get something of value out 
of settlement, studies of employment discrimination cases sug-
gest that settlement amounts are often quite low, and “typically 
[do] not provide what [the parties] would view as justice.”215 A 
second reason is that a low rate of success in cases that go to 
judgment may reflect a body of case law that is relatively un-
friendly to plaintiffs. Some scholars have sought to explain the 
low win rate for employment discrimination plaintiffs on the 
ground that defendants in employment cases often will be re-
peat players, who—for the reasons discussed above216—have an 
incentive to settle all but the strongest cases so as to avoid rul-
ings with adverse consequences for other cases or for business 
practices more generally.217 That theory does not necessarily 
signal good news for employees. As already explained, judge-
made law can be shaped in powerful ways by the cases in which 
legal questions are presented. If the class of litigated cases is 
dominated by those that are strong for the defendant and weak 
for the plaintiff, the result is likely to be not only a high defend-
ant win rate, but also a set of precedents that favors defend-
ants.218 That is especially true at the appellate level, where rul-
ings often establish principles that will affect decisions in later 
cases.219 In the long run, the adverse effects of defendant-
friendly substantive law may far outweigh the benefits to 
plaintiffs of increased settlements, especially if those settle-
ments tend to be small.  
To be sure, there are many reasons why employment dis-
crimination cases are hard to win. Perhaps the most prominent 
are judicial bias and the difficulty of proving discriminatory in-
tent.220 My claim here is not that litigation incentives are en-
 
the possible effects of the 1991 amendments on settlement, and made no effort 
to control for other factors that might have affected the settlement rate. Cler-
mont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 20–21. 
 215. Nielsen et al., supra note 70, at 35. 
 216. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.  
 217. See Kotkin, supra note 68, at 117. 
 218. See Cross, supra note 66, at 8; Lederman, supra note 6, at 234–35. 
 219. As noted above, employment-discrimination plaintiffs fare very poorly 
on appeal. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title 
VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. 
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tirely to blame for the low win rate in employment discrimina-
tion litigation. Rather, it is that litigation incentives may not 
help as much as their supporters seem to believe, and may 
make matters worse. 
Employment discrimination is not the only area where liti-
gation incentives may have triggered an adverse judicial re-
sponse. Antitrust scholars have argued, along similar lines, 
that the Supreme Court has made it increasingly difficult for 
antitrust plaintiffs to prevail.221 Many of those same scholars 
have identified treble damages as the fuel for such decisions.222 
Concerned that the prospect of treble damages will encourage 
“lawyers to turn every conceivable tort and contract dispute in-
 
REV. 1201, 1203 (1982) (“Evidence of illicit intent may be extremely difficult to 
obtain, whether the responsible individuals are conscious of their bias, and 
therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expressing unconscious 
bias through some discretionary decisionmaking process.”); Selmi, supra note 
206, at 562 (suggesting that judicial bias has a large impact on the outcome of 
employment discrimination cases and that the biases vary depending on the 
type of discrimination); Swaminathan, supra note 206 (discussing the impact 
of subconscious biases on employment discrimination and on judicial deci-
sionmaking in these cases, noting that “[t]here is little reason to believe that 
federal judges, who are predominantly white and the majority of whom are 
men, are any less susceptible than the general population to cognitive or im-
plicit biases in decision making”).  
 221. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 53, at 413–14 (“The litigation process for a 
prevailing private [antitrust] plaintiff is sometimes divided into three hurdles: 
(1) antitrust liability must be shown . . . ; (2) the fact of damage must be shown 
. . . ; and (3) the amount of damage must be shown . . . . [A]t an earlier time, 
both hurdle number 2 and hurdle number 3 were lower than they now are.”).  
 222. Baker, supra note 3, at 384 (“Mandatory trebling [in antitrust] can 
distort judicial decision making on substantive and procedural questions be-
cause it necessarily makes judges more reluctant to impose liability in close 
cases and more willing to erect narrower standing rules.”); Breit & Elzinga, 
supra note 53, at 443 (“As courts have recognized the inefficiencies of private 
actions, and yet have been constrained by the Clayton Act’s mandatory trebl-
ing provision, their response has been an indirect reduction of the reach and 
pecuniary magnitude of private actions. This has taken the form of stricter 
standards regarding liability, standing, and damage estimation.”); Salop & 
White, supra note 143, at 1039 (“As the potency of the treble damages remedy 
has come to be recognized, . . . the courts may have been trimming plaintiffs’ 
powers and strengthening defendants’ powers in the other dimensions, so as to 
regain the desired overall balance.”). The Federal Trade Commission agrees. 
See Intel Corporation, Docket No. 9341, 2009 WL 4999728 (2009) (“[C]oncern 
over class actions, treble damages awards, and costly jury trials have caused 
many courts in recent decades to limit the reach of antitrust. The result has 
been that some conduct harmful to consumers may be given a ‘free pass’ under 
antitrust jurisprudence, not because the conduct is benign but out of a fear 
that the harm might be outweighed by the collateral consequences created by 
private enforcement.”). 
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to an antitrust action,”223 and wary of imposing excessive pen-
alties “where the [defendant’s] conduct seems ambiguous and 
complicated,”224 courts have adopted deliberately underinclu-
sive rules for antitrust liability.225 Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ 
win rates in private antitrust actions are lower than average.226  
The courts’ treatment of predatory pricing claims is in-
structive. The crux of a predatory pricing claim is that the de-
fendant is charging artificially low prices in order to drive com-
petitors out of business.227 But low prices are not inevitably a 
bad thing—quite the contrary. The trick, then, is to draw the 
liability line in a way that condemns predatory conduct while 
permitting socially optimal pricing. Treble damages complicate 
that task, because the prospect of a ruinous damages award 
may induce firms to steer well clear of conduct that might pos-
sibly subject them to liability. The gains a firm can expect from 
lowering prices are likely to be less than the cost of a treble 
damages award (plus attorney’s fees), should a competitor sue 
successfully.228 Recognizing that treble damages increase the 
costs of false positives in private antitrust suits, courts have 
“sharply constricted the right of action for predatory pricing.”229  
 
 223. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 8 (2005). 
 224. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New 
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 
675 (2009). 
 225. Id.; see also Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1159, 1210 (2008) (“Often, concerns about the chilling effect of the treble-
damages remedy and abusive private litigation influence the courts to imple-
ment underinclusive liability norms in private suits.”); Lemos, supra note 5, at 
466 (discussing the connection between underinclusive liability rules and con-
cerns about treble damages and unpredictable jury awards). 
 226. See Salop & White, supra note 143, at 1011–12; see also WILLIAM 
BAXTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST: PRINCIPAL PAPER BY 
WILLIAM BAXTER 16–21 (Robert D. Tollison ed., 1980) (reporting that plaintiffs 
in private antitrust actions between 1964 and 1970 won 15.2 percent of the 
time and attributing that low rate to the relatively greater stakes in antitrust 
cases to defendants). 
 227. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 
1399 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 228. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 41, 43 (2005) (discussing the cost-benefit analysis from the perspec-
tive of predators and innocent competitors, respectively). 
 229. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 41 
(2008); see also Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: 
Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 23 n.88 (1995) (noting that predatory pricing plaintiffs “must overcome 
deliberately underinclusive liability rules”). 
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Comparable claims have been made about judicial treat-
ment of civil suits under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), which, like the antitrust statutes, 
promises treble damages and attorney’s fees to successful 
plaintiffs.230 Judges have become increasingly frustrated with 
“‘the novel—and often imaginative—ways in which civil plain-
tiffs have attempted to use [RICO’s] flexibility in order to ex-
ploit [its] provisions for treble damages and attorneys [sic] 
fees.’”231 And, as in the antitrust arena, judges have expressed 
the concern that the lure of treble damages awards may en-
courage strike suits, as “the defendant, facing a tremendous fi-
nancial exposure in addition to the threat of being labeled a 
‘racketeer,’ will have a strong interest in settling the dis-
pute.”232 Courts have accordingly construed RICO’s civil provi-
sions strictly,233 leading to a “stunningly awful final success 
rate” for plaintiffs.234 Notably, they have done so in the face of 
an explicit congressional instruction that the statute’s terms 
are to be “liberally construed.”235  
Constitutional tort litigation, which Congress facilitated 
with a one-way fee shift enacted in 1976, provides a final cau-
tionary example. Stewart Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg 
have found that, “[u]nder any measure of tangible success, con-
stitutional tort plaintiffs are less successful than non-civil-
rights plaintiffs.”236 Constitutional tort plaintiffs settle fewer 
cases than other civil plaintiffs.237 They also win far fewer of 
 
 230. See David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil RICO: Traditional Canons of 
Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 41, 42, 45–46 (1996); id. at 42 (“[J]udicial hostility to the on-
slaught of private actions brought under RICO has led courts to construe 
RICO’s civil provisions strictly . . . .”).  
 231. Id. at 45–46 (quoting Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 763 (7th Cir. 1992)); 
see also G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil 
RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 62 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 526, 580 (1987) (arguing that the lower courts are “hostile to civ-
il RICO” and that “[j]udicial efforts to narrow the scope of the statute continue 
largely unabated”). 
 232. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 233. For a discussion of relevant case law, see Blakey & Cessar, supra note 
231, at 580–90 & nn.230–39; Kurzweil, supra note 230, at 70–77, 86–88. 
 234. Bucy, supra note 1, at 22. 
 235. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 
Stat. 922, 947. 
 236. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 740. 
 237. Id. at 759–60 & fig.3. 
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the cases that go to judgment.238 And matters only got worse 
after 1976. Schwab and Eisenberg report that “the plaintiff-
defendant spread [in win rates] became sharply more negative 
for civil rights plaintiffs in the two years (1977 and 1978) im-
mediately following enactment of the fees act, at a time when 
the [plaintiff-defendant] spread for non-civil-rights actions was 
increasing sharply.”239 
As some of the examples here suggest, hostility to litigation 
incentives may have an important political component. As 
noted in Part I, although Democratic and Republican con-
gresses alike have made use of litigation incentives, mechan-
isms like damage enhancements and fee shifts are used most 
frequently by liberal legislative majorities. And, while it is 
possible to point to examples of litigation incentives in conserv-
ative legislation,240 such statutes pale in comparison to the 
many important environmental and antidiscrimination stat-
utes that shift fees and/or enhance damages for prevailing 
plaintiffs. Thus, it should come as no surprise if the judges who 
are unsympathetic to the substantive rights that Congress has 
sought to promote through litigation incentives, and who are 
therefore likely to resent an increase in the number of claims 
filed, largely fall right of center. An aversion to litigation incen-
tives also may be linked to judicial hostility to litigation more 
generally, based on a conception of the judicial role that seeks 
to minimize the opportunities for judicial intervention into so-
cial problems. Several commentators have found evidence of an 
anti-litigation bias in the work of the modern Supreme Court, 
particularly among the more conservative Justices.241 If judges 
 
 238. Id. at 760–61 & fig.4. 
 239. Id. at 760. Schwab and Eisenberg note that the plaintiff-defendant 
spread was in decline between 1975 and 1976, making it unclear whether the 
further downturn after 1976 can be attributed to the enactment of CRAFAA. 
Id. at 760 n.140. Recall, however, that Schwab and Eisenberg concluded that 
“scant evidence exists to support a filing increase attributable to the fees act.” 
Id.; see also supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. They also emphasized 
that a plaintiff-side fee shift should have the greatest effect on meritorious 
cases. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 747. Thus, it is unlikely that 
CRAFAA prompted an increase in the proportion of weak claims filed, which 
in turn caused the drop in plaintiffs’ success rates.  
 240. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 68 (discussing the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Liber-
tad) Act of 1996, and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). 
 241. See Andrew M. Siegel, Notes Toward an Alternate Vision of the Judi-
cial Role, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 511, 511 & n.1 (2009) (arguing that in recent 
years “the Supreme Court has grown increasingly skeptical about the efficacy 
of litigation, increasingly parsimonious in construing federal statutes that fa-
  
2011] SPECIAL INCENTIVES TO SUE 837 
 
who hold conservative political views in fact tend to ascribe to a 
vision of judging that sees private litigation as a threat to dem-
ocratic governance, then such judges will naturally disfavor lit-
igation incentives regardless of the substance of the relevant 
statute.  
The risk of judicial backlash, then, depends to a large de-
gree on judges’ views about the claims that Congress is seeking 
to encourage. When Congress and the federal bench are ideo-
logically aligned, litigation incentives may offer benefits at rel-
atively little cost. But, while Congress tends to rely less on ad-
ministrative agencies when the executive branch is controlled 
by an ideologically distant president,242 there is no evidence 
that Congress has taken account of the ideological make-up of 
the federal judiciary when it enacts provisions like fee shifts 
and damage enhancements. Instead, legislators seem to have 
assumed, as commentators have, that more claims mean more 
wins—or at least that higher litigation rates will not make 
matters any worse for the plaintiff class. 
Consider the situation confronting the Democrat-controlled 
Congress in 1990. The Supreme Court had just handed down 
five decisions interpreting Title VII, each of which favored the 
defendant employer.243 The most controversial was Wards Cove 
 
cilitate litigation, and increasingly uninterested in insuring the availability of 
functional remedies for the violation of federal rights” and citing representa-
tive commentary); Paul B. Stephan, Empagran—Empire Building or Judicial 
Modesty? 6 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper, 
Series No. 2010-07, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559879 (“How-
ever widely Republican appointees may diverge on cultural or political issues, 
they may share . . . a skepticism about civil justice as a litigation rationale.”). 
 242. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE 
POWERS 147, 158–60 (1999) (showing that Congress is less likely to delegate at 
all during periods of divided government, and, when it does delegate, Congress 
is more likely to choose independent agencies than executive agencies subject 
to greater presidential control). 
 243. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 754 (1989) 
(holding that unsuccessful intervenors are responsible for the plaintiff ’s attor-
ney’s fees only when their actions were “frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation”); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989) (requiring 
that plaintiffs file challenges to a discriminatory seniority system at the time 
the system was adopted, not when its effects were felt); Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. 755, 761–69 (1989) (holding that white firefighters are not precluded from 
challenging employment decisions implemented as the result of a consent de-
cree); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650–55 (1989) (revising 
the burdens of pleading and proof in disparate impact claims); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237–58 (1989) (holding that the defendant can rebut 
a mixed-motive claim of gender discrimination by proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it would have made the same decision regardless of sex). 
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Packing Co. v. Atonio, which made it significantly more difficult 
for plaintiffs to prevail on disparate impact claims (claims 
based on discriminatory effect rather than intent).244 Prior to 
Wards Cove, the prevailing rule was that, once a plaintiff estab-
lished a disparate impact, the burdens of production and per-
suasion shifted to the defendant to justify the challenged prac-
tice. The Supreme Court had not provided clear guidance on 
what would suffice for justification, and the lower courts were 
split on whether the defendant had to show that the practice 
was necessary or merely related to success on the job.245 Wards 
Cove appeared to adopt a standard that was more lenient than 
either of the two prevailing contenders, explaining that the de-
fendant need only show that the practice “serves, in a signifi-
cant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”246 
The Court also shifted the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff 
on the justification point.247 Interest groups demanded a legis-
lative response. Congress considered several amendments to 
Title VII, some procedural and others substantive, but faced a 
veto threat from President George H.W. Bush.248 On the Wards 
Cove issue, the proposed override provision obligated employers 
to demonstrate that the challenged practice was “required by 
business necessity,” and defined that term to mean “essential to 
effective job performance.”249 For the Bush Administration, 
such a requirement would “all but compel employers to adopt 
quotas by making Title VII liability hinge on bad numbers.”250 
Bush accordingly vetoed the first bill that emerged from Con-
gress. Congress came close to overriding the veto, but fell short 
by one vote in the Senate.251 The bill’s supporters went back to 
the drawing board in an effort to reach a compromise. They 
were aided in their efforts by outside events that weakened the 
 
 244. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645–46. 
 245. See Andrew M. Dansicker, A Sheep in Wolf’ s Clothing: Affirmative Ac-
tion, Disparate Impact, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 1, 16 & nn.15–16 (1991).  
 246. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (disclaiming any requirement “that the 
challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business”). 
 247. Id. at 659–60. 
 248. For a detailed discussion of the legislative override process, see 
FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, ch. 6. 
 249. S. 2041, 101st Cong. §§ 3(o), 4(k)(2) (1990). 
 250. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/ 
Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 639 (1991). 
 251. See Neil A. Lewis, President’s Veto of Rights Measure Survives By 1 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at A1, available at 1990 WLNR 2946688. 
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opposition from congressional Republicans.252 Nevertheless, 
Congress capitulated on the Wards Cove issue, opting to omit 
any definition of the key term “business necessity” and focusing 
instead on procedural questions such as the amount of en-
hanced damages and the length of the statute of limitations.253 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was eventually adopted by 
both houses and signed by the President, was heavy on proce-
dure but did little to improve the prospects for disparate-impact 
plaintiffs.254 
In sum, faced with a hostile judiciary and a social problem 
that is not easily illuminated through adversary litigation, 
Congress’s response was to encourage more lawsuits. Perhaps 
 
 252. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 187–88 (discussing 
Anita Hill’s charges of sexual harassment by Supreme Court nominee Clarence 
Thomas and the national media attention to Republican gubernatorial candi-
date David Duke, a “former Klansman turned self-styled ‘white nationalist’”).  
 253. Cf. Farhang, Congressional Mobilization, supra note 4, at 11 (describ-
ing the provisions for enhanced damages as “by far the most significant 
changes wrought” by the 1991 amendments). 
 254. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1992) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). As enacted, the 1991 Act shifted 
the burden to the defendant to “demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity,” 
but did not define the key term. § 105(a)(1), 105 Stat. at 1074; see also Dan-
sicker, supra note 245, at 13 n.78 (“The 1991 Act sidestepped the issue of dis-
parate impact and Griggs because the Act did not specifically define the term 
‘business necessity.’ The difficult task of interpreting this vital term was left to 
the courts.”). Moreover, the Act contained a provision limiting the legislative 
history that courts could use to supply meaning to the term “business necessi-
ty.” § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075. The only authorized source of legislative histo-
ry is an interpretive memorandum stating that “the terms ‘business necessity’ 
and ‘job related’ are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Su-
preme Court” in cases “prior to” Wards Cove. 137 CONG. REC. 28,680 (1991). 
Rebecca Hanner White has argued that the proviso about legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress was well aware that “its phrasing of the employ-
er’s burden . . . was fraught with ambiguity.” Rebecca Hanner White, The 
EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the 
Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 52 
n.12 (noting as well the “many additional ambiguities” in the 1991 Act). In-
deed, the lower courts are still split on the appropriate test for disparate im-
pact cases. See Cristine Nardi, Comment, When Health Insurers Deny Cover-
age for Breast Reconstructive Surgery: Gender Meets Disability, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 777, 802 n.153 (noting that “courts are split as to whether an employer 
must provide a legitimate business reason or a compelling justification” (cita-
tions omitted)). Compare Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the 
New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1164 (1993) (arguing that Wards 
Cove is still good law after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991), with 
Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrim-
ination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 388 (1996) (arguing for a strict business ne-
cessity standard under the Act). 
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that was the most that one could have expected, given the polit-
ical climate.255 But, as described above, it would be a mistake to 
view the 1991 amendments as an unvarnished success for civil 
rights advocates. Although litigation incentives certainly pro-
vide some benefits to litigants and their attorneys, they also 
have costs—and may prove to be counterproductive. Interests 
groups and legislators should heed those potential costs, and 
should not view mechanisms like one-way fee shifts and en-
hanced damages as an easy fix or a substitute for substantive 
statutory change. 
C. IS BACKLASH SO BAD? 
I have argued that litigation incentives may have the un-
fortunate and unintended consequence of pushing the law in a 
direction adverse to the rights that Congress and interested 
groups sought to promote. Courts may adopt procedural mech-
anisms (such as stricter rules for pleading) that make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to proceed very far through the court-
house door, and they may cut back on substantive protections 
in ways that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. 
Thus, while litigation incentives may encourage more plaintiffs 
to sue, they may eventually cause more plaintiffs to lose.  
One possible objection to this argument is that, even if the 
risk of judicial backlash is realized, litigation incentives will 
leave potential plaintiffs no worse off than if the incentives had 
never been enacted. Recall the economic theory discussed in 
Part II, which predicts that a rational plaintiff will sue if the 
expected value of litigation exceeds the expected costs. Suppose 
that, at the moment Congress is considering amending a given 
statute to add a litigation incentive—double damages for pre-
vailing plaintiffs, for example—the relevant body of case law is 
such that the average plaintiff has a sixty percent chance of 
success at trial. And suppose that, prior to any statutory 
amendment, the average plaintiff can expect to recover $50,000 
if she wins. The expected value of litigation for the average 
plaintiff is $30,000 (.6 x $50,000). If Congress amends the stat-
 
 255. The primary alternative to a “private enforcement” regime—greater 
enforcement by the relevant agency, which in the context of Title VII is the 
EEOC—was not a promising solution from the perspective of Congress in the 
early 1990s. The EEOC had a dismal record of enforcement under the Reagan 
Administration, and seemed unlikely to improve under President Bush. See 
FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 190–93. The best alternative 
seems to be substantive change to Title VII, which would increase the proba-
bility of success for plaintiffs.  
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ute to provide for mandatory doubling, the available judgment 
will increase to $100,000 and the expected value of litigation 
will increase to $60,000 (.6 x $100,000). Assuming that the av-
erage plaintiff does not anticipate attorney’s fees in excess of 
$60,000, the rate of litigation should increase.  
Now suppose that judges react to the new stream of cases 
with decisions that reduce the average plaintiff ’s likelihood of 
success. Even if new judicial doctrine reduces the average 
plaintiff ’s chances by half—pushing the probability of success 
down to thirty percent—the expected value of litigation will be 
no worse than before the amendment.256 If the average plain-
tiff ’s expected costs are roughly equivalent to what they were 
pre-amendment, then the ultimate rate of litigation under this 
hypothetical statute also will be no lower than the pre-
amendment status quo. Fewer plaintiffs will prevail, but those 
who do win will recover twice the amount of damages.  
Arguably, then, this hypothetical litigation incentive has 
had a positive (if temporary) effect, even though the law has 
changed in ways that favor defendants. For a while, more 
plaintiffs were suing and roughly sixty percent of them were 
recovering more money—$100,000 instead of $50,000. Even-
tually the case law responded, and the probability of plaintiff 
success decreased accordingly. But the end result is at worst 
the same as the status quo pre-amendment.  
The difficulty with this line of argument is that it ignores 
the importance of compensation for individual plaintiffs. Al-
though the total transfer from defendants to plaintiffs is the 
same pre- and post-amendment,257 the upshot of the damage 
enhancement is that only half as many plaintiffs are able to 
share in the recovery. In areas where victim compensation is an 
important policy goal, that result is neither normatively desir-
able nor normatively equivalent to the pre-amendment situa-
tion where sixty percent of plaintiffs recovered $50,000.258 De-
 
 256. A thirty-percent chance of recovering $100,000 is equal to $30,000, 
which is the same as a sixty-percent chance of recovering $50,000. 
 257. Assume that 100 plaintiffs would sue prior to the amendments, and 
100 plaintiffs will sue after the statute is amended and judicial doctrine ad-
justs accordingly. Under the first scenario, sixty of the plaintiffs would recover 
$50,000, for a total of $3,000,000. Under the second scenario, thirty of the 
plaintiffs will recover $100,000, which yields the same result. 
 258. Compensating victims is not always a central goal of litigation. In the 
context of environmental citizen suits, for example, private plaintiffs do not 
recover any personal damages—any judgment is paid into the U.S. Treasury. 
In such circumstances, it should make no difference (from the perspective of 
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creasing the number of plaintiffs who prevail also may have 
negative consequences for the market for legal services. In 
areas where contingency fee or “no win, no pay” arrangements 
are common, more plaintiffs losing means more attorneys going 
without payment. Attorneys may be less willing to take cases 
that have a low probability of success, particularly if the costs 
of litigation are relatively high.259 Bear in mind that the rele-
vant costs may include satellite litigation over the incentive it-
self. If our hypothetical statute included a fee shift instead of or 
in addition to the damage enhancement, both plaintiffs and de-
fendants could anticipate significant additional costs sunk into 
disputes over fees.260 As a result, the total social cost of litiga-
tion may be higher after the amendment even if plaintiffs file 
the same number of claims. 
A second possible objection is that increased litigation 
rates are valuable in their own right because they increase de-
terrence.261 Farhang has argued, for example, that the 1991 
amendments to Title VII had the laudable effect of increasing 
voluntary compliance by employers. Farhang has shown that 
the 1991 amendments increased the number of claims filed un-
der Title VII (as discussed in Part II), and that “[t]he rate of 
private job discrimination litigation is a statistically and sub-
stantively significant force driving organizations’ adoption of 
[certain effective] compliance strategies.”262 Other studies call 
into question the link between Title VII litigation and im-
 
compensation) whether thirty percent or sixty percent of plaintiffs prevail. The 
important number is the total amount of recovery from defendants.  
 259. Attorneys and advocacy groups that handle a large number of similar 
cases may be able to spread costs across cases, so that they can absorb the 
costs of litigating four cases without compensation so long as the fifth case 
yields a large recovery. But for those who have a choice between litigating, 
say, employment discrimination cases or contract cases, the low probability of 
success (and hence payment) in the former context may well push the choice 
toward the latter. Cf. Zemans, supra note 28, at 203 (“[W]ith fees dependent 
upon a successful outcome, cases not likely to win are screened out of court.”). 
 260. Robert W. Fioretti & James J. Convery, Attorney’s Fees: The Mush-
rooming Cloud of Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 947 (1985) (“With the 
proliferation of fee-shifting statutes, litigation to determine the amount of the 
awards has also multiplied. The result has been an alarming growth in attor-
ney’s fees litigation.”); Krent, supra note 53, at 2082–83 (acknowledging that 
“one-way fee shifting statutes have significant impact in increasing overall lit-
igation costs”). 
 261. For a discussion of the link between litigation and deterrence, as well 
as the important difference between specific and general deterrence, see 
FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 8–9, 203–04.  
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provements in the employment prospects for minorities and 
women,263 even at firms that have been subject to suit them-
selves.264 Still others dispute the core premise that private liti-
gation has positive effects on compliance.265 Of course, if pri-
vate litigation does not lead to more deterrence generally, then 
increasing the rate of litigation is unlikely to improve matters. 
However, even if one assumes that there is a positive connec-
tion between private litigation and deterrence, it does not fol-
low that litigation incentives necessarily will generate more de-
terrence. Economic theory predicts that potential violators will 
weigh the costs and benefits of violating the law and will act 
only if expected gains outweigh expected losses, taking into ac-
count the likelihood of detection, litigation, and an adverse 
judgment.266 Clearly, as the rate of litigation rises in the rele-
vant area, so does the likelihood of suit, with all its attendant 
costs. But, equally clearly, potential violators will factor in the 
probability of losing those suits and facing damages awards 
and other sanctions.267 All else equal, any judicial decisions 
that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail will reduce 
the deterrent effects of litigation by decreasing the risk of sanc-
tion. Doctrinal changes that reduce the probability of plaintiff 
success likewise will reduce litigation rates, which will dampen 
deterrence even more.  
 
 263. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Na-
ture of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1032–33 
(1991) (arguing that Title VII suits have become more common but less effective 
over time, in part because early litigation targeted the most obvious forms of 
discrimination, and in part because litigation tends to focus on firing rather than 
hiring and so may discourage employers from hiring women and minorities). 
 264. Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 25, at 889–90 (finding that while lawsuits 
sometimes had positive effects on the employment of women and minorities, 
“first lawsuits had no effects on black women and men in the 1980s, and nega-
tive effects on both in the 1990s”); id. at 860 (discussing the 2001 Skaggs study 
that found declines in managerial diversity in supermarkets following a set-
tlement or award associated with litigation); Lynn Perry Wooten & Erika 
Hayes James, When Firms Fail to Learn: The Perpetuation of Discrimination 
in the Workplace, 13 MGMT. INQUIRY 23, 30 (2004) (finding that many of the 
employers surveyed had faced repeated Title VII lawsuits because they had 
not changed their employment practices in response to earlier suits). 
 265. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 3, at 66–67 (arguing that private environ-
ment litigation may lead to “inconsistent and unfair” enforcement of environ-
mental law, “destroy ongoing cooperative compliance,” and “spawn a culture of 
resistance” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 266. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 4, at 8–9, 22; supra notes 
91–92 and accompanying text. 
 267. See Salop & White, supra note 143, at 1019. 
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In the context of Title VII, litigation rates increased follow-
ing the 1991 amendments but have been dropping sharply 
since 1998. There is no indication that the drop in litigation is 
due to a drop in discrimination. Instead, the decrease in the 
number of claims filed seems to reflect “a growing awareness, 
especially with the prolonged lack of success on appeal, that 
employment discrimination plaintiffs have too tough a row to 
hoe.”268 If deterrence is tied to litigation rates, deterrence is de-
clining. Yet, because the 1991 amendments increased the dam-
ages available to prevailing plaintiffs, the expected costs of dis-
crimination for employers weighing the costs and benefits of a 
possible personnel decision may still be higher now than in 
1991.  
My claim here is not that litigation incentives will always 
lead to a net loss in deterrence. Rather, it is that commenta-
tors, advocates, and legislators should not assume too quickly 
that litigation incentives will generate more litigation and more 
deterrence. The level of voluntary compliance, like the level of 
litigation, depends in important part on the content of the rele-
vant law. If judges react to heightened litigation rates with 
hostility, moving the law in an anti-plaintiff direction, fewer vi-
olators will be sued and fewer will be sanctioned. Voluntary 
compliance will decrease accordingly. 
  CONCLUSION   
Congress frequently relies on mechanisms like one-way at-
torneys’ fee shifts and enhanced damages in order to encourage 
private enforcement of federal statutes. Yet there is surprising-
ly little information about how litigation incentives work. The 
available empirical evidence calls into question whether statu-
tory mechanisms designed to raise litigation rates will serve 
their intended purpose. In at least some contexts, litigation in-
centives seem to serve a largely symbolic role: Congress ap-
pears to be doing something to advance a particular substan-
tive cause, but not much changes in practice. 
To date, commentary on litigation incentives has not con-
sidered how judges respond to mechanisms designed to in-
crease litigation rates. My analysis suggests that when litiga-
tion incentives “work,” they may backfire. A judge who believes 
that a given type of claim is uninteresting or unimportant is 
unlikely to react favorably to an increase in the number of 
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those claims filed in his court. While it is theoretically possible 
that the judge would become more sympathetic to the claims 
after hearing more and more of them, the structure of the liti-
gation system is not conducive to judicial learning. A more like-
ly result is that the judge will respond to the increase in litiga-
tion rates by invoking tools that help him dispose of the cases 
more quickly—or to discourage plaintiffs from filing them in 
the first place. In fact, judges have cut back on litigation incen-
tives themselves by interpreting them narrowly and have 
shaved away at the substantive rights that the incentives were 
designed to promote.  
The risk of judicial backlash is just that: a risk. I have em-
phasized that hostility is not the only possible response to in-
creased litigation rates, and that the likelihood of an adverse 
judicial response to a given incentive will depend in important 
respects on the ideological make-up of Congress and the judi-
ciary. But, like any other consequence that is both negative and 
uncertain, the possibility of judicial backlash decreases the 
worth of litigation incentives for those who seek to advance the 
substantive project of a given statute. Legislators and interest 
groups should recognize as much, and should avoid over-
valuing litigation incentives when bargaining over statutory 
policy. 
